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We use a comprehensive dataset of French manufacturing firms to study their internal orga-
nization. We first divide the employees of each firm into ‘layers’using occupational categories.
Layers are hierarchical in that the typical worker in a higher layer earns more, and the typical
firm occupies less of them. In addition, the probability of adding (dropping) a layer is very pos-
itively (negatively) correlated with value added. We then explore the changes in the wages and
number of employees that accompany expansions in layers, output, or markets (by becoming
exporters). The empirical results indicate that reorganization, through changes in layers, is key
to understand how firms expand and contract. For example, we find that firms that expand
substantially add layers and pay lower average wages in all pre-existing layers. In contrast, firms
that expand little and do not reorganize pay higher average wages in all pre-existing layers.
1 Introduction
Labor is not a homogeneous input. Employees are distinct in their levels of skill, knowledge,
experience, and a vast variety of other dimensions. So an important decision made by firms is
to determine not only the number but also the characteristics of their employees, as well as the
role that each of them plays in the firm. We refer to these decisions as the organization of a firm.
In this paper we aim to describe empirically the organization of firms and how this organization
is related to other firm characteristics, including export status. We are particularly interested in
understanding if firms actively manage their organization —and therefore the number and knowledge
of their employees—and how they do this. Understanding these decisions is important in order to
∗We thank Ariel Burstein, Luis Garicano, Bob Gibbons, Gene Grossman, Maria Guadalupe, Gordon Hanson, Oleg
Itskhoki, Wolfgang Keller, Sam Kortum, Francis Kramarz, Claire Lelarge, Marc Melitz, Steve Redding, Peter Schott,
Chris Sims, and John van Reenen for useful conversations and comments. The computations in this paper were done
at a secure data center located at CREST, Paris. Caliendo acknowledges the support from the Yale MacMillan Center.
Caliendo: lorenzo.caliendo@yale.edu, Monte: ferdinando.monte@jhu.edu, and Rossi-Hansberg: erossi@princeton.edu.
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understand the characteristics of firms and therefore the behavior of the aggregate economy. As
far as we know, this is the first empirical study of the internal organization of firms that uses a
comprehensive dataset with a large number of firms.
We use a sample of the large majority of French manufacturing firms during the period 2002-
2007.1 To organize the data in a practical and meaningful way, we first introduce the concept of a
‘layer’of employees. The concept of a layer is adopted from the theory of management hierarchies
proposed initially by Garicano (2000) and used in the context of heterogeneous firms in Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). In this theory a layer of employees is a group of managers or workers,
with similar characteristics and knowledge, who perform similar tasks within the organization.
Conceptually, these layers are hierarchical in the sense that higher layers of management are smaller
and include more knowledgeable employees who have as subordinates employees in lower layers.
Dividing the employees in real firms into layers requires some mapping between these concepts
and the data. The first part of the map involves using wages as a one-dimensional measure of the
marketable characteristics of employees, that is, to view wages as a measure of the ‘knowledge’of
workers. In this vein, if one individual is more knowledgeable than another (in terms of practical
knowledge used in production) he will obtain a higher wage. The second part of the map is to group
workers into layers. To do so we use information on occupational characteristics. Fortunately,
the French data we use provide hierarchical occupational categories. The top occupation includes
owners who receive a wage. The next one below includes senior staff and top management positions;
the next one employees at a supervisory level. The lowest two occupations include clerks and blue
collar workers. We document that they earn similar wages and so we pull them together into one
layer. This gives us a maximum of four hierarchical layers of employees. Of course, many firms (in
fact, most of them) do not employ agents in all of these layers, something we exploit extensively in
this paper.
We then investigate whether this division of the employees in a firm into layers is an economically
meaningful classification. We cut the data in a variety of ways that indicate that it is. Firms with
more layers are larger in terms of value added and employment, and, in general, pay higher wages.
Around 50% of the variation in wages within firms is variation across layers. A large majority of
firms have adjacent layers that start at the bottom. When they add or drop a layer, it is mostly
an adjacent layer and they add or drop only one. Layers within firms are also different from each
other. Lower layers are larger in the number of hours of work and employ agents who earn lower
wages. Thus, most firms are hierarchical in their layers both in terms of wages and in terms of time
employed at each layer. In addition, the probability of adding a layer is increasing in value added
and the probability of dropping one is decreasing in value added. All these facts are very significant
in the data and robust to accounting for industry and time fixed effects. So we conclude that the
layers we identify using occupations are not arbitrary names but have an economic meaning in
terms of the characteristics of the employees they group and the tasks they perform.
The next step is to understand how firms change their organization – the knowledge and number
1A detailed description of the data is relegated to Appendix B.
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of employees at each layer– as they grow. It is useful to go back to the theory in order to guide
our exploration. We rely on Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012, from now on CRH) as our guide,
since their general equilibrium theory of production hierarchies allows for firm heterogeneity, which
is important in the data.2 In this theory firms organize production to economize on their use of
knowledge: a costly input. Production requires time and knowledge. Workers in layer zero work
on the production floor. To produce, they need to solve the problems they face in production.
Their knowledge allows them to solve some, but not all, the problems they face. If they can solve
a problem output is immediately realized. Otherwise, they can ask agents in higher layers how to
solve them. Since they do not know anything about these problems, they first ask the managers in
layer one. These managers spend their time communicating with the workers and understanding
their problems. They in turn solve some of them and pass the rest to the second-layer managers
and so on. The problem of the firm is to decide the number of hours of work and the level of
knowledge of employees in each layer and how many layers to have in the firm. The number of
hours of the top manager is fixed and common across firms.
A firm with higher demand, or higher exogenous idiosyncratic productivity, optimally decides
to have more layers. Its larger scale allows it to economize on the total cost of knowledge by
having many layers of management with very knowledgeable managers at the top, but much less
knowledgeable employees in the bottom layers. The theory in CRH implies that some firms that
expand value added will add layers. However, some others might expand without adding layers
since the expansion is not large enough to make the added cost of an extra layer (namely, the wage
of the new top manager) worth paying. The trade-off is simple: lower ‘marginal’cost from having
less knowledgeable employees in the existing layers (because the new top manager can solve the
less frequent questions) versus higher ‘fixed’cost from having to pay an extra, and large, wage of
the top manager. So it is worth paying the ‘fixed’cost only if the expansion is large enough. Thus,
in the theory, firms that expand by adding layers reduce wages and increase the number of hours
at all layers, while firms that expand but do not add layers increase both hours and wages at all
layers.
We go to the data guided by these implications. We look at firms that expand and add layers
and firms that contract and drop layers. In particular, we estimate changes in log wages and
changes in log hours of work normalized by hours in the top layer, for firms that add or drop layers.
The implications discussed above hold for each layer in firms with any number of layers. We do
not find any instance in which these implications are falsified by the data. We then look at firms
that expand but do not add or drop layers. We find that these firms expand hours and wages at
all layers. Note the key finding: If firms expand by adding layers, wages in preexisting layers fall,
while if firms expand without reorganizing, wages rise. Importantly, our findings are not simply the
result of regrouping workers with the same wages across layers. We document that the distribution
of wages in preexisting layers shifts down for all percentiles when firms grow by adding layers, while
2Throughout, we refer mostly to the theory of CRH, although some of the arguments we advance can be traced
back to Garicano (2000) or Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
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it shifts up for all percentiles when firms grow without reorganizing. All these results reverse when
we focus on firms that contract.
These findings are consistent with the theory in CRH but contradict theories of effi ciency
wages, or Nash bargaining, in which firms that expand always pay higher wages, independently
of organizational changes. Several studies have documented that average wages at firms increase
with firm size, or as firms expand: the size-wage premium (Abowd, et al., 1999, Brown and Medoff,
1989, Oi and Idson, 1999, Bernard and Jensen, 1997, 1999, and Frias, et al., 2009). Our findings are
not inconsistent with these findings. What we document, among other things, is that the size-wage
premium is reversed when we condition on the firm reorganizing by adding layers and we focus on
workers in preexisting layers.
Next we explore organizational change in firms that become exporters. Exporters are larger,
employ more hours of labor, pay higher wages, and have more layers. Firms with more layers are
much more likely to be exporters. For example, among firms with three layers of management (the
highest number of layers given that they also have a layer of workers) 90.2% of the value added is
generated by firms that also export. All of these facts are consistent with the standard finding in
the literature that exporters are larger and are also consistent with CRH where larger firms have
weakly more layers. Hence, it is perhaps more interesting to turn our attention to new exporters.
We find that new exporters are more likely to add layers than non-exporters (and symmetrically
firms that exit exporting are more likely to drop layers). In addition, new exporters that add layers
decrease average wages in existing layers while exporters that do not add layers increase them.
The well-known finding (see Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997, and Verhoogen 2008) that firms that
become exporters pay higher wages is the result of a composition effect. In fact, the firms that
expand significantly as a result of exporting, namely, the ones that add layers, reduce average
wages. Furthermore, they do so at all pre-existing layers. In contrast, new exporters that do not
change layers barely expand but do increase wages. Since there are more new exporters that do
not change layers than there are exporters that do change layers, the average effect on wages is
positive but small. The result is relevant for the conceptualization of new exporters. The notion
that new exporters expand and increase the wages of their employees either because they upgrade
their technology (and so the marginal product of labor is higher) or because profits are higher
and they share them with workers (via a wage sharing or bargaining mechanism) is at odds with
our data.3 The data are consistent with a view in which new exporters that expand significantly
change their organizational design and economize on knowledge by employing less knowledgeable
employees who are paid less.
Several other papers have studied the internal organization of firms using small samples of pro-
ducers (a few hundred). For instance, Caroli and van Reenen (2001) use surveys from England and
France to find that the wage bill share of different skill levels change as firms delayer. These results
support our finding that delayering is associated with systematic occupational shifts.4 Garicano
3Felbermayr, et al. (2008), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Helpman, et al. (2010) and Eaton, et al. (2011)
propose models were the exporter-wage premium is the outcome of a bargaining mechanism.
4Caroli and van Reenen (2001) has the advantage of using a measure of delayering directly reported by managers
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and Hubbard (2007) study the role of hierarchies as a means of organizing production in law firms.
They use confidential data from law offi ces from the 1992 Census of Services. They find that as
market size increases, the ratio of associates to partners increases. We document a similar finding
for manufacturing firms in France. We find that as firms expand, either by adding layers or not,
the number of hours worked by lower-level employees relative to higher-level ones expands. Rajan
and Wulf (2006), using a sample of 300 large U.S. firms for the period 1986 to 1998, analyze how
hierarchies of top-level managers have changed over time. The study shows that the CEOs’span of
control has increased, while the number of layers between division heads and CEOs has gone down
during the sample period. Thus, they find evidence that such hierarchies have ‘flattened’over time
and have decentralized their decision making. Using a large comprehensive dataset for France, we
document that firms have also become ‘flatter’during the period 2002 to 2007. In a similar study,
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), using the same data as Rajan and Wulf (2006), find evidence that
exposure to the export market makes firms reorganize their production. We find that firms that
enter the export market are more likely to reorganize production than non-exporters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes in more detail the
essential features of the theory in CRH that guides our empirical exploration. Section 3 describes
the data and our construction of layers and shows the basic characteristics of firms and layers.
Section 4 presents our findings on organizational changes as a result of changes in layers and
expansions in value added. Section 5 presents the results for new exporters and firms that exit
the export market. Section 6 discusses how firms change average wages in a layer and Section
7 concludes. Appendix A presents a variety of robustness checks and extensions of the results
in the main text. Appendix B describes in detail the data, its manipulation, and our empirical
methodology.
2 A Theory of Organization with Heterogeneous Firms
In this section we discuss briefly the framework in CRH. Given that the purpose of the current
paper is to describe and understand the data, we present the theory in its simplest form and do
not discuss all the details fully. The interested reader is directed to CRH for the more technical
discussions and all proofs of the results.
We consider an economy with Ñ identical agents with preferences that lead to a demand for
variety α given by x (p, α;R,P ) where p denotes the price, R revenue, and P the price index. We
assume that agents like varieties with higher α better, so ∂x (p, α;R,P ) /∂α > 0 and, as usual,
∂x (p, α;R,P ) /∂p < 0. Agents are endowed with one unit of time that they supply inelastically
and obtain an equilibrium wage w̄ for their unit of time. Agents acquire knowledge in order to solve
the problems they encounter during production. Learning how to solve problems in an interval of
knowledge of length z costs w̄cz (c teachers per unit of knowledge at cost w̄ per teacher). Since the
rather than indirectly inferred from the occupational structure, like ours. The advantage of our approach is that it
relies less on the subjective views of managers and more on their observed actions. Our measure also allows us to use
the universe of manufacturing firms instead of specialized surveys.
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cost of knowledge is linear, agents receive it back as compensation for their work. Hence, the total
wage of an employee with knowledge z is given by w = w̄[cz + 1].
An entrepreneur pays a fixed entry cost fE in units of labor to design her product. After
doing so, she obtains a demand draw α from a known distribution G(α). The draw α determines
the level of demand of the firm. If the entrepreneur decides to produce she pays a fixed cost f
in units of labor. Production requires labor and knowledge. Agents employed in a firm act as
production workers (layer ` = 0) or managers (layers ` ≥ 1). We denote by n`L, z`L, and w`L, the
number, knowledge, and total wage of employees at layer ` = 0, 1, 2... of an organization with L
layers of management (or L + 1 layers of employees, given that we call the layer of workers layer
zero). Workers use their unit of time to generate a production possibility that can yield one unit of
output. For output to be realized the worker needs to solve a problem drawn from a distribution
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We characterize the problem using the variable cost function. Let C (q;w) denote the minimum
variable cost of producing q units, and CL (q;w) the same cost if we restrict the organization to
producing with L layers of management. Then,
C (q;w) = min
L≥0








q ≤ F (ZLL )n0L, (2)
w`L = w̄[cz
`
L + 1] for all ` ≤ L, (3)
n`L = hn
0
L[1− F (Z`−1L )] for L ≥ ` > 0, (4)
nLL = 1. (5)
So one entrepreneur, nLL = 1, chooses the number of layers, L, employees at each layer, n
`
L, and
the interval of knowledge that they acquire, z`L, subject to the output constraint and the time
constraints of employees at each layer. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting average cost function
C (q;w) /q as a function of q. It is the lower envelope of the average cost functions restricted to
have a given number of layers, CL (q;w) /q. The minimum of these average cost functions decreases
with the number of layers and is reached for higher output levels the higher the layer. Each point
in that curve is associated with a particular organization. Namely, it is associated with a number
of layers, and a number of employees and their knowledge at each layer.
5To derive some of the implications of the theory, CRH specify the distribution of problems as an exponential, so
F (z) = 1− e−λz.
6
Importantly, as proven in CRH, as firms increase the number of layers by one in order to produce
more, the number of agents in each layer increases and the knowledge in all pre-existing layers, and
therefore the wage, decreases. In Figure 1 this is illustrated as a change from q(α) to q (α′′). The
logic is straightforward. Firms add layers to economize on the knowledge of their workers. So when
they add a new top layer, they make the new manager deal with the rare problems and make lower
level employees know less. The lower knowledge in all pre-existing layers reduces, by equation (4),
the span of control of each manager in the organization. However, the number of employees in all
layers still goes up since the span of control of the new top manager is larger than one.
0 2 4 6 8 10
Hierarchy at 
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Figure 1: The average cost function C (q;w) /q as a function of q
Figure 1 also illustrates how firms grow when they do not add layers (a change from q (α) to
q (α′) in the figure). In this case we see that the number of workers in all layers increases, as do the
knowledge and wages of all workers. This is the only way the firm can expand given the number of
layers. Because the span of managers is given by the knowledge of their subordinates, the only way
the firm has to increase output is to increase the knowledge of its employees. Since the knowledge
of agents at different layers is complementary, the firm does so at all layers. So the implications of
the model on how firms grow and how the wages and knowledge of their employees vary depends
crucially on whether firms add layers or not. Clearly, firms that want to expand substantially
change the number of layers, while firms that do not want to expand that much, in general, keep
the number of layers fixed. We investigate all of these implications in our empirical analysis below.
So far we have not said anything about how the quantity produced is determined. To do
so we need to turn to the profit maximization and entry decision of the firm. CRH embed the
cost function discussed above into a standard Melitz (2003) type framework with heterogeneity in
demand. Given that we exploit the general equilibrium of the model only in a limited way, we
direct the reader to CRH for details. Here we only state that the model yields an optimal quantity
produced, which is increasing as a function of the demand draw α. So a higher demand draw leads
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to a higher quantity and, as described above, a new organization.
The model in CRH also allows us to study the effect of a new opportunity to export on the
organization of firms. Essentially, the possibility to export has effects similar to those of a larger
demand draw α. So exporters are larger and therefore have more layers. Furthermore, new exporters
that add layers reduce the knowledge and wages of pre-existing layers and increase the number of
employees in those layers. New exporters that do not add layers increase wages, knowledge, and
the number of employees at all layers.
To sum up, the model has the following implications:
1. Firms are hierarchical, n0L ≥ ...n`L... ≥ nLL for all L.
2. Layers, L, sales pq, and total number of employees,
∑L
`=0
n`L, increase with α.
3. Given L, w`L and n
`
L increase with α at all `.
4. Given α, w`L decreases and n
`
L increases with an increase in L at all `.
5. Exporters sell more and have more layers than non-exporters.
6. When firms start exporting:
a) L increases weakly.
b) Exporters that do not change L increase w`L and n
`
L at all `.
c) Exporters that increase L decrease w`L and increase n
`
L at all `.
Armed with these implications, and the way of organizing the data dictated by the theory, we
now turn to our empirical analysis of the anatomy of French production hierarchies.
3 The Data
We use confidential data collected by the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) for the
period 2002 to 2007. We do not use the data before 2002 because the occupational categories,
which we use to determine layers below, changed that year. To construct our unique dataset, we
merge two different sources of mandatory reports. First is the BRN dataset, which includes the
balance-sheet data of private firms. It includes 553,125 firm-year observations in the manufacturing
sector. Second is the DADS dataset, which includes occupation, hours of work, and earning reports
of salaried employees. In matching the datasets, we lose 5.9% of the observations and we lose
another 11.5% from cleaning the data. The resulting sample covers on average over time 90.7% of
total value added in manufacturing. We should note that small firms can choose not to report in
the BRN. However, firms that choose not to report add up to a small share of value added, since
they are included in the 9.3% of value added not included in our sample. A detailed description of
the construction and characteristics of the dataset is included in Appendix B.
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In order to dissect this large dataset in a way that we can understand and analyze through the
lens of the theory described in the previous section, we first need to determine what constitutes a
layer of workers or management in the data. To do so, we use the PCS-ESE classification codes for
workers in the manufacturing sector. Remember that the notion of a layer is a group of employees
who have similar knowledge levels and wages and who perform tasks at a similar level of authority.
That is, our purpose is not to separate employees in a firm according to the functional characteristics
of the tasks they perform (e.g., whether they are accountants or lawyers) but rather based on their
hierarchical level in the organization, that is, based on the number of layers of subordinates that
they have below them. The PCS-ESE is, we believe, ideal for this purpose. For manufacturing
it includes five occupational categories classified with numbers from 2 to 6.6 The classes we use,
together with their class number, are:
2. Firm owners receiving a wage (which includes the CEO or firm directors).
3. Senior staff or top management positions (which includes chief financial offi cers, heads of
human resources, and logistics and purchasing managers).
4. Employees at the supervisor level (which includes quality control technicians, technical, ac-
counting, and sales supervisors).
5. Qualified and non-qualified clerical employees (secretaries, human resources or accounting
employees, telephone operators, and sales employees).
6. Blue collar qualified and non-qualified workers (welders, assemblers, machine operators and
maintenance workers).
Throughout the paper we merge classes 5 and 6, since the distribution of wages of workers
in these two classes is extremely similar, indicating similar levels of knowledge. Table 1 shows
percentiles of the distribution of wages in the different classes of workers, all expressed in 2005
euros.7
Table 1: Distribution of average hourly wage by occupation in 2005 euros
CEO, directors Senior staff Supervisors Clerks Blue collars
Mean 75.60 47.91 26.30 19.06 20.83
p5 22.33 19.56 13.14 9.74 9.67
p10 26.99 23.07 15.01 11.00 10.94
p25 38.86 28.93 18.14 13.03 12.88
p50 54.62 35.96 21.87 15.63 15.24
p75 75.07 44.62 26.44 19.01 18.34
p90 106.04 56.95 32.76 23.73 22.58
p95 132.17 69.01 38.94 28.33 26.94
6Class 1 is only used for farmers and so is never present in our data.
7Throughout the paper all nominal variables are expressed in 2005 euros.
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The distributions are clearly ranked. CEOs make the most money, and wages decrease as we
reach classes 5 and 6, which are practically identical. In order to match the numbers of these
occupational classes with the theory, we order them from the bottom up. So classes 5 and 6 will
form the layer of workers, namely, layer zero. Class 4 of supervisors will form the first layer of
managers, layer 1. Senior staff will be included in layer 2, and CEOs and firm directors will form
layer 3. So firms can have a maximum of 4 layers, starting with layer zero and moving all the way
up to layer 3. Throughout the rest of the paper we refer to the number of layers in the firm by the
number of management layers. So a firm that has a layer of workers and two layers of managers is
referred to as a firm with two layers.
3.1 Firms with a different number of layers are different
We aim to establish that this classification of workers into layers is a meaningful economic clas-
sification. Of course, this occupational classification could just constitute some arbitrary names
given to particular workers in an organization that are not systematic across firms. The evidence
in Table 1 suggests otherwise. Wages across these occupations are evidently ranked. Clearly, much
more is needed. We dedicate the rest of this section to convincing the reader that this classification
is useful. In Tables 2 and 3 we present some basic statistics of our dataset.
Table 2: Data description by year
Average
Year Firms VA Hours Wage # of layers
2002 79,260 2,909 83,749 22.07 1.59
2003 77,768 2,900 82,704 22.51 1.58
2004 76,448 2,934 81,445 23.33 1.58
2005 75,426 2,786 78,090 24.07 1.55
2006 74,818 2,823 77,697 23.29 1.53
2007 72,918 2,685 73,515 23.98 1.50
Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage = average hourly wage
in 2005 euros.
Table 2 presents the number of firms by year as well as average value added, hours of work,
wages, and layers. There is little variation by year in the data, as is evident from the table. We
classify a firm as having a particular layer if it reports employing a positive number of hours in
that layer. On average, firms in our sample employ a positive number of hours in about 1.5 layers.
It is important for our purposes that firms do not tend to employ workers in all layers, since we
will analyze how firms change as they add or drop layers of management. Given that on average
firms have only slightly more than 1.5 layers of management and that they can have a maximum
of three layers of management (plus one layer of workers), there are ample opportunities for firms
to add new layers.
10
Table 3: Data description by number of layers in the firm
# of Average Median
layers Firm-years VA Hours Wage* wage
0 81,909 205 7,946 29.44 17.08
1 126,069 403 16,450 20.96 17.99
2 161,449 2,821 85,674 20.99 19.45
3 87,211 8,879 227,070 22.23 20.78
Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage* = average hourly wage in 2005
euros from trimmed sample (0.05% top and bottom in each cell).
Table 3 presents the average characteristics of firms across layers. Clearly, firms with more
layers are larger in terms of value added and hours. They also tend to pay higher wages. The
last fact is more evident when we look at the median than at the mean given that there are some
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Figure 4: Firm average hourly wage distribution by number of layers
The figures also show the distributions after we control for time and industry fixed effects (which
as can be seen in the figure do very little). The distributions provide a picture very similar to the
one we obtained from just looking at the means. Firms with more layers are larger and tend to pay
higher average wages. As a robustness check, Table A1 and Figure A1 in Appendix A show the
same findings using an alternative measure of wages (from DADS) that does not include payroll
taxes and other expenses. A description of the data is presented in Appendix B. The evidence in
this section has documented not only that layers do not simply group workers in arbitrary ways
but that firms with different numbers of layers are different in economically meaningful ways.
3.2 Firms have adjacent layers and form hierarchies
So far we have studied firms with different total numbers of layers but not which layers firms actually
do include in their organization. Table 4 shows that the vast majority of firms have adjacent layers
starting from layer zero. That is, 87.17% of the firms in our sample that have zero layers of
management actually have layer zero. These are also the largest firms in terms of employment, as
they account for 95.86% of the total employment of firms with zero layers. As another example,
consider the firms with two management layers. About 80% of them include layers zero to two.
The remaining 20% are missing one of these layers and include layer three. Note that, weighted by
employment or value added, these firms account for less than 7%. So the producers that do not
have adjacent layers starting from layer zero are the smallest firms in the sample. Clearly, all firms
with three management layers have adjacent layers starting from zero since they have all layers.
Overall, 81.57% of firms have adjacent layers starting at zero and they account for 96.65% of value
added. The results that follow in general do not depend on whether we restrict the sample to firms
with adjacent layers (what we label ‘selected sample’). These robustness checks are included in
Appendix A.
Not only do firms have adjacent layers but they form hierarchies. That is, the number of hours
employed in the lowest layer is, in most of them, larger than in the first layer of management, which
is larger than the second layer of management, which is larger than the top layer (if the firm has
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all these layers). Table 5 presents the fraction of firms that satisfy this hierarchical criterion for
hours in all layers and in each of them individually. Table A39 in Appendix A presents the averages
weighted by value added.
Table 4: Percentage of firms that have adjacent layers
Among firms with: 0 layers 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers All firms
Unweighted 87.17 67.22 79.98 100 81.57
Weighted by V A 85.84 68.01 94.54 100 96.65
Weighted by hours 95.86 72.38 93.15 100 95.74
A particular ranking of layers is hierarchical in the sense that the upper layer is smaller than the
lower one in at least 74% of cases in the data. Almost all firms with one layer satisfy the ranking.
However, only slightly more than half of the firms with all layers satisfy the ranking in all layers. So
most firms are hierarchical in terms of hours, but we have a relatively large number of exceptions in
at least one layer. In contrast, when we look at the hierarchy in wages —namely, whether workers in
higher layers earn more than workers in lower layers—the hierarchy is satisfied in the vast majority
of cases. We present this evidence in Table 6. All individual rankings are hierarchical in more than
87% of cases, and even firms with three layers of management are hierarchical in all the rankings
in about 80% of cases. Table A40 in Appendix A presents the averages weighted by value added.
Table 5: Firms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours
# of layers N `L≥ N
`+1
L all ` N
0
L ≥N1L N1L ≥N2L N2L ≥N3L
1 85.3% 85.3% - -
2 62.0% 85.2% 74.0% -
3 54.3% 85.8% 76.4% 86.6%
N`L = hours at layer ` of a firm with L layers.
Table 6: Firms that satisfy a hierarchy in wages
# of layers w`+1L ≥w`L all ` w1L ≥w0L w2L ≥w1L w3L ≥w2L
1 92.1% 92.1% - -
2 86.2% 93.6% 92.5% -
3 79.7% 96.5% 94.4% 87.8%
In sum, we conclude from this evidence that it is accurate to think of the representative firm as
hierarchical, with more hours of work in lower layers, but workers that are paid less.
Figure 5 represents graphically the firms in our sample. Each panel in the graph represents
firms with different numbers of layers. Each layer is represented using a square. The length of the
square represents the average number of hours employed in the layer by firms with a given number
of layers. The height of the square represents the average hourly wage of employees in that layer
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(so the area is the total wage bill of the layer). The hierarchical organization of labor is evident.
Also evident is the way in which firms with more layers organize differently. In the next section we
study the particular changes in wages and hours by layer as firms expand.













Hierarchy of a 0 layer firm














Hierarchy of a 1 layer firm















Hierarchy of a 2 layer firm
















Hierarchy of a 3 layer firm
Figure 5: Representative hierarchies
Figure 6 presents the same representative hierarchies when we normalize the number of hours
of each layer by the number of hours in the top layer. Our model keeps the number of hours at the
top layer fixed, so this normalization is desirable when we contrast the implications of the theory
with our data. All the characteristics of the representative hierarchies that we discussed in Figure
5 are also present in Figure 6 after normalizing.
The theory in CRH as well as our empirical analysis underscores average wages at each layer.
Clearly this is a simplification since workers within a layer are bound to be heterogenous in their
knowledge; for example, due to the individual histories of workers and the frictions faced by firms
to hire and fire employees with particular levels of knowledge. Still, we have not said anything
about how much of the variation in wages within the firm is explained by variation across layers
rather than by variation within layers. This is relevant since if the fraction explained by cross-layer
variation was negligible, our focus on layers would be clearly misguided, at least when it comes to
analyzing the distribution of wages within firms. Table 7 shows that this is not the case.
The mean share of variation in log wages explained by variation in layers for all firms is about
half, independently of how we weight firms. The share is zero for firms with zero layers of manage-
ment (since, by definition, for these firms there is no cross-layer variation in log wages) and grows
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to 66% for firms with three layers of management. The table reassures us that variation in wages
across layers is essential to understand the distribution of wages within firms.
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Figure 6: Representative hierarchies normalized by hours in the top layer
Table 7: Mean share of variation in wages explained by cross-layer variation
Weighted by
Firm-years Unweighted Hours V A
All firms 440,443 0.50 0.51 0.50
Firms with more than 0 layers 374,568 0.59 0.52 0.50
Firms with 0 layers 65,875 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firms with 1 layer 125,911 0.50 0.41 0.43
Firms with 2 layers 161,447 0.62 0.52 0.50
Firms with 3 layers 87,210 0.66 0.63 0.50
3.3 Layer transitions depend on size and firms add or drop adjacent layers
Let us now investigate how many producers add or drop layers in a given period. Table 8 shows
that between 60 and 70% of firms in a given period maintain their number of layers. From the
remaining, some firms exit, with the exit rate decreasing with the number of layers. Clearly, of the
firms that change layers, the majority adds or drops only one of them. In fact, out of the firms
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with adjacent layers, most of the firms that add one add an adjacent layer (75.4% for zero-layer
firms and 82.9% for firms with one layer of management; see Table A2 in Appendix A). Hence,
when firms add or drop layers they tend to drop or add an adjacent layer, and only one of them.
This is all consistent with the view, provided by the theory, that firms add layers to expand and
drop layers to contract, and do so in a systematic way. Since very large expansions are rare, we
see few transitions that add or drop more than one layer. Table A3 in Appendix A shows that the
same pattern as in Table 8 is observed even if we weight the firms by their value added.
Table 8: Distribution of layers at t+ 1 conditional on layers at t
# of layers at t+ 1
Exit 0 1 2 3 Total
0 15.4 67.1 15.3 2.0 0.2 100
# of layers 1 9.9 10.8 62.0 16.2 1.1 100
at t 2 7.6 1.2 13.2 67.5 10.5 100
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Figure 7: Transitions across layers depend on value added
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We can also study the probability of adding or dropping one or more layers as a function of the
size of the firm in terms of its value added. Figure 7 shows a lowess smoothing interpolation of the
probability of changing the number of layers to any count, as a function of the value added of the
firm, for firms with different initial numbers of layers. If, for example, firms receive shocks to their
demand parameter α over time, and these shocks are drawn from a common arbitrary distribution,
the model predicts that the probability of adding a layer should increase with value added. In
contrast, the probability of dropping a layer should decrease in value added. Furthermore, the
probability of adding one layer should be larger than the probability of adding two, which should
also be increasing in value added. This is exactly what happens in Figure 7.
The probability of adding layers is always increasing in value added and of dropping is always
decreasing, and the ranking of probabilities is always consistent with the predictions of our theory,
augmented with some simple stochastic process for the fundamentals. Figure 7 does not include
confidence bands in order to enhance the visibility of the curves. However, in Figure A1 in Appendix
A we present a graph with all the individual observations and show that they line up fairly tight
around the interpolation estimates. Appendix B describes all the details and choices made to
construct Figure 7.
The evidence in this section has documented that layers do not just group workers in arbitrary
ways but that firms with different numbers of layers are different in economically meaningful ways.
In addition, we have documented that changes in the number of layers are also systematic and are
determined by the size of the firm. We now turn to analyze how firms change their organization,
layer by layer, when they decide to expand or contract.
4 How Do Firms Expand?
In this section we analyze how firms change when they expand or contract. The main body of
evidence we present tracks firms over time and, therefore, controls for a variety of individual firm
characteristics, such as industry. This, we believe, is the ideal way of analyzing the predictions of
our theory in the data and we do so below. However, before we present our results over time, it
is informative to analyze briefly the cross-section of firms. In particular, we study the relationship
between value added and normalized hours in a given layer, `, for firms with L layers, n`L, or the
wage of the workers in a given layer `, w`L. The theory predicts that if we focus on firms with a
given number of layers, L, n`L, and w
`
L should increase with value added absent any other source of
heterogeneity across producers. Of course, firms are different in many dimensions and so instead of
a one-to-one relationship we find substantial heterogeneity in n`L and w
`
L for any given level of value
added. Nevertheless, Figures A3 to A9 in Appendix A show a positive and significant relationship
between log value added and the log of n`L and w
`
L for every ` ∈ 0, 1, ..., L and every L.
The theory also has a more subtle prediction. Namely, that the slope of the relationship
between the log of value added and normalized hours should decrease as we consider higher layers
of management. The reason is that a larger firm with the same L has more knowledgeable workers
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in all layers, as discussed in Section 2, and so larger spans of control at all layers. Figures A3 to
A5 in Appendix A, together with Table 9, show that the ranking of the slopes is the one predicted
by the model for firms with two management layers but not for firms with three layers (where
the ranking is reversed). The differences between the elasticities are significant at the 1% level for
all comparisons. The table also shows the estimates when we add time and industry fixed effects
(again see Appendix B for details). The failure of the implication of the model for firms with three
layers is the result of cross-sectional heterogeneity, as we show below.
Table 9: Normalized hours within layers
Without FE With FE
Normalized hours lnV A s.e. lnV A s.e.
lnn01 .411 .005 .349 .005
lnn02 .186 .003 .158 .003
lnn12 .100 .002 .096 .003
lnn03 .663 .004 .669 .003
lnn13 .734 .003 .719 .003
lnn23 .773 .004 .765 .004
All p-values < 0.01. Excluding top and bottom 0.05%
Table 10: Wages within layers
Without FE With FE
Wages lnV A s.e. lnV A s.e.
lnw00 .039 .002 .072 .004
lnw01 .051 .002 .059 .002
lnw11 .083 .002 .086 .002
lnw02 .040 .001 .045 .001
lnw12 .039 .001 .043 .001
lnw22 .068 .001 .073 .001
lnw03 .045 .001 .048 .001
lnw13 .043 .001 .046 .001
lnw23 .072 .001 .072 .001
lnw33 .192 .002 .192 .002
All p-values < 0.01. Excluding top and bottom 0.05%
Similarly, we can look at the ranking of the slopes of the relationship between log wages and
log value added. Now the model predicts that the elasticity should be higher, the higher the
management layer. The firm economizes by expanding the knowledge of higher layers more, since
there are fewer of those managers. This is in fact the case in the majority of comparisons, except for
a couple that are not significant, as is evident in Table 10. Thus, among firms with the same number
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of layers, the larger ones pay higher wages, and proportionally higher at the top of the hierarchy.
Note that these comparisons are treating all the sources of heterogeneity across firms that are not
accounted for by value added as classical measurement error. This is certainly a stretch, so it is
somewhat surprising that these predictions still emerge so clearly in our data.
The evidence above is informative about the differences across firms with similar characteris-
tics, in particular, the same number of layers. However, it is confounded by other dimensions of
heterogeneity across firms. We now move to time series evidence that tracks firms over time. Let
us start by looking at the same prediction we analyzed in the cross-section. That is, we study how
n`L and w
`
L change as the firm increases its value added. We estimate a regression of the form




Ld lnV Ait + εit, (6)
where i refers to a particular firm with L management layers, t is the time period, and d is a yearly
time difference (e.g., d lnn`Lit = lnn
`
Lit+1 − lnn`Lit).
Table 11: Elasticity of n`L with V A for firms that do not change L
# of layers Layer β`L s.e. p-value obs
1 0 0.044 0.012 0.00 65,114
2 0 0.046 0.009 0.00 91,833
2 1 0.019 0.010 0.07 91,833
3 0 0.109 0.014 0.00 53,053
3 1 0.048 0.013 0.00 53,053
3 2 0.037 0.013 0.01 53,053
Table 11 presents the estimates of β`L for all ` ∈ 0, 1, ..., L and every L. Note that since we
are normalizing hours by the number of hours in the top layer, we can look at the value of β`L for
` = 1, ..., L− 1 only. First note that as predicted by Implication 3 of the theory in Section 2, given
L, firms grow by increasing the number of hours at all layers. Furthermore, now the ranking of the




L for ` < `
′, although in one instance the difference is not
significant. Hence, these results show that once we control for firm fixed effects, the predictions of
the theory are in line with our findings. As a robustness check we present in Table A42 the results
with the selected sample. We conclude that when firms grow but keep the same number of layers,
they employ more hours of work at all layers but proportionally more in the lower layers. So firms
become flatter, with a wider base.
We do the same analysis for wages. In particular, we estimate




Ld lnV Ait + εit, (7)
where now d lnw`Lit denotes the log difference in wages. The results are presented in Table 12 and
are, as were the cross-sectional results, for the most part consistent with the theory. Namely, γ`L is
19
positive and significant for all ` ∈ 0, 1, ..., L and every L. Furthermore, γ`L < γ`
′
L for ` < `
′, in most
cases, apart from a couple of instances where the difference is not significant. Hence, we reinforce
the conclusion that when firms grow without changing the number of layers, they increase wages
(or knowledge according to the theory) in all layers, but they increase wages proportionally more
at the top of the firm. Table A37 in Appendix A presents several robustness checks.
Table 12: Elasticity of w`L with V A for firms that do not change L
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.077 0.007 0.00 45,606
1 0 0.098 0.006 0.00 65,114
1 1 0.116 0.006 0.00 65,114
2 0 0.145 0.006 0.00 91,833
2 1 0.156 0.006 0.00 91,833
2 2 0.172 0.006 0.00 91,833
3 0 0.173 0.009 0.00 53,053
3 1 0.187 0.009 0.00 53,053
3 2 0.189 0.010 0.00 53,053
3 3 0.218 0.011 0.00 53,053
The above analysis paints a familiar picture of the way firms expand. Firms expand by adding
more workers of all types, by hiring more knowledgeable workers, and by paying them more. Most
models of firm dynamics (like Lentz and Mortensen 2008, among many others) share these features
with the theory outlined in Section 2 when firms keep the number of layers constant. The next
subsection shows that when a firm’s expansion leads to a change in the number of layers —a reor-
ganization of the firm—many of these findings are altered in a significant way, specifically, the one
predicted by Implication 4 in Section 2 above.
4.1 Expansions that add layers
We first look at how firm-level outcomes change depending on whether firms add or drop layers of
management. Table 13 shows the average log changes in total hours, total normalized hours, value
added, and average wages (including and excluding the new top manager in the case of adding
layers) for all firms, the ones that add layers, the ones that do not change layers, and the ones
that drop layers. As one can see in the first column of the table, most of these variables exhibit
some trend over time, and so the average log change is significantly different from zero. To account
for this, we also present average changes after we control for time trends (see Appendix B for
details). Clearly, adding layers is related to increasing hours, normalized hours, and value added.
In contrast, firms that add layers decrease average wages once we take out the common time trend.
Furthermore, if we look at wages in the pre-existing layers only, wages fall significantly, by 13.7%.
The results are reversed when we select only firms that drop layers. Now wages rise by 13.6%.
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These estimates demonstrate that in firms that expand by adding layers, wages in pre-existing
layers fall. As far as we know, this is inconsistent with most theories in the labor and firm dynamics
literatures. In these theories firms that expand always increase the wages they pay. Note also that
since overall wages increase (without de-trending), as do wages of firms that do not exhibit changes
in layers, the fall in wages cannot be the result of reverse causality in which drops in wages cause
expansions. If that were the case, we would see drops in wages associated with expansions in all
firms, not only the ones that add layers. Furthermore, we would not obtain the opposite result when
we select only firms that drop layers. Of course, the theory in Section 2 is exactly consistent with
this evidence on wages. Implication 4 says that, as firms add layers, the knowledge and therefore
wages at all layers should decrease.
Table 13: Change in firm-level outcomes
All Increase L No change in L Decrease L
d ln total hours -0.014*** 0.056*** -0.011*** -0.093***





L -0.011*** 1.366*** 0.012*** -1.408***
- detrended - 1.377*** 0.023*** -1.396***
d lnV A -0.008*** 0.032*** -0.007*** -0.049***
- detrended - 0.039*** 0.001 -0.040***
d ln avg wage 0.018*** -0.001 0.018*** 0.038***
- detrended - -0.020*** -0.000 0.020***
- common layers 0.020*** -0.117*** 0.018*** 0.156***
- - detrended - -0.137*** -0.002*** 0.136***
% firms 100 12.75 73.48 13.78
% V A change 100 39.21 65.65 -4.87
*** significant at 1%.
The results in Table 13 suggest that wages in firms that add or drop layers behave differently
than previously thought. Table 13 also shows that the firms that add or drop layers represent an
important fraction of firms in the economy, as well as an important fraction of value added. Firms
that add layers represent 12.75% of the total. Furthermore, as they are on average larger than
their counterparts that do not add layers, they contribute 39.2% of the total change in value added.
Inversely, firms that drop layers represent 13.78% of firms and contribute -4.87% to the change
in value added. Together, the firms that reorganize by changing layers and that therefore change
wages in the new way we uncover represent more than a quarter of the firms in the economy and
contribute more than 40% of the absolute changes in value added. So the firms that change their
organization to expand and contract do not represent a fringe of the firms in the economy. They are
essential to understanding firm dynamics and the associated labor market outcomes. The theory
of organization with heterogeneous firms in CRH can rationalize the behavior of these firms.
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Table 14: d lnn`Lit for firms that transition
# of layers Layer d lnn`Lit s.e. p-value obs
Before After
0 1 0 1.520 0.017 0.00 10432
0 2 0 1.745 0.053 0.00 1350
0 3 0 2.312 0.193 0.00 111
1 0 0 -1.585 0.017 0.00 11356
1 2 0 0.710 0.012 0.00 17052
1 2 1 0.533 0.012 0.00 17052
1 3 0 1.218 0.048 0.00 1168
1 3 1 1.018 0.047 0.00 1168
2 0 0 -1.801 0.046 0.00 1698
2 1 0 -0.696 0.012 0.00 17927
2 1 1 -0.537 0.012 0.00 17927
2 3 0 1.338 0.014 0.00 14228
2 3 1 1.277 0.016 0.00 14228
2 3 2 1.167 0.016 0.00 14228
3 0 0 -2.203 0.157 0.00 142
3 1 0 -1.112 0.041 0.00 1493
3 1 1 -0.948 0.039 0.00 1493
3 2 0 -1.427 0.014 0.00 15303
3 2 1 -1.359 0.015 0.00 15303
3 2 2 -1.274 0.015 0.00 15303
We now proceed to analyze in more detail firms that change their layers of management. In
particular, we are interested in whether firms that add layers add hours of work to all layers and
decrease wages in all layers. The results above tell us that this is the case on average, but they do
not imply that this happens layer by layer. Table 14 computes average log changes in normalized
hours for firms that transition between layers. Each line in the table represents a particular type of
transition (e.g., from two to three layers) and a particular layer in firms that undergo that transition.
The first column in the table indicates the number of management layers in the initial period and
the second column the number of layers in the second period. The third column indicates the layer,
`, for which we are calculating the average (over i and t) of d lnn`Lit. The fourth column indicates
the coeffi cient of interest. Note first the sign of the average change. It is positive and significant for
all firms that increase the number of layers (by one or more layers). Symmetrically, it is negative in
all layers for all firms that drop one or more layers, exactly what we would expect from the theory
in Section 2. So Table 14 indicates that the firm-level outcomes on normalized hours from Table
13 not only hold for the firm as a whole, but they hold layer by layer too. All our estimates are
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significant at the 1% level.8 Appendix A presents a variety of robustness checks. In particular,
it presents the results when we only use firms with adjacent layers and we condition on firm-level
outcomes, such as expansions in hours or value added.
Table 15: d lnw`Lit for firms that transition
# of layers Layer d lnw`Lit s.e. p-value obs
Before After
0 1 0 -0.131 0.005 0.00 10432
0 2 0 -0.432 0.024 0.00 1350
0 3 0 -0.943 0.131 0.00 111
1 0 0 0.201 0.005 0.00 11356
1 2 0 -0.041 0.003 0.00 17052
1 2 1 -0.245 0.004 0.00 17052
1 3 0 -0.165 0.018 0.00 1168
1 3 1 -0.416 0.02 0.00 1168
2 0 0 0.489 0.022 0.00 1698
2 1 0 0.085 0.003 0.00 17927
2 1 1 0.275 0.004 0.00 17927
2 3 0 -0.008 0.002 0.00 14228
2 3 1 -0.054 0.003 0.00 14228
2 3 2 -0.185 0.004 0.00 14228
3 0 0 1.102 0.12 0.00 142
3 1 0 0.188 0.014 0.00 1493
3 1 1 0.417 0.017 0.00 1493
3 2 0 0.029 0.002 0.00 15303
3 2 1 0.060 0.003 0.00 15303
3 2 2 0.153 0.004 0.00 15303
We do the same analysis layer by layer for changes in wages. Namely, we compute the average
(over i and t) of d lnw`Lit for firms that add or drop layers. We present the results in Table 15.
Again, the table confirms that the results we obtained for firm-level outcomes hold layer by layer,
8The theory also predicts that the proportional change in the hours of employees in higher layers should be larger
than the proportional change in the hours of employees in lower layers. The reason is that the knowledge of all
employees falls and so does the span of each manager. This results in positive but smaller proportional changes in
hours at the bottom of the firm, when the firm adds a layer. In Table 14 we see, in most cases, exactly the opposite.
As in the case of firms that keep the number of layers constant, the lower layers expand proportionally more. Several
forces can be responsible for this mismatch between the theory and the data. First, during a year, firms that switch
might also have grown without further changes in the number of layers. Since according to the theory the rank of the
log changes is different depending on whether layers are added or not, what we see could be the result of one effect
dominating the other. Second, there could be frictions in hiring that make lower layers easier to expand than higher
ones. This would be the case if hiring more knowledgeable employees is more costly and takes more time. Finally, the
theory suggests that changes in communication costs, h, as the firm adds layers could also reverse the implications
of the theory on this ranking.
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as the theory predicts. Firms that add layers reduce wages in all pre-existing layers and firms
that drop layers increase wages in all the layers of the reorganized firm. Again, these results are
robust to conditioning on large firm expansions in value added, normalized hours, or both, as well
as to restricting the sample of firms with adjacent layers. Furthermore, we corroborate our results
using a different source of wage data. Tables with the robustness checks are presented in Appendix
A and the description of the tables are presented in Appendix B. The conclusion is that many
firms expand by adding layers of management and these firms reduce the salary of workers in all
pre-existing layers (or, accordingly, their knowledge as the theory would suggest). The theory also
predicts that, as a firm adds layers, the wages of higher level managers should fall proportionally
more than those of lower level ones (since their knowledge is more sustitutable with that of the top
manager), a prediction also corroborated by Table 15.
The finding is surprising in light of theories of firm growth that do not put organization at center
stage. Expansions associated with any revenue-enhancing shock (like a demand or an exogenous
productivity shock) are, in virtually all of these theories, associated with increases in employee
wages. The channels vary, but the result is the same. Sometimes wages rise because the marginal
product of workers increases, sometimes because they share some of the rents, and sometimes
because the bargaining position of the worker improves. In contrast, in the theory of CRH, wages
go down because by adding an extra layer of management the firm can have top managers deal with
the exceptional problems and make workers learn only how to solve the most common problems.
The firm economizes on knowledge by having more experts together with less knowledgeable workers
and lower-level managers who earn less. Of course, this new organization is only optimal if the firm
expands enough, since it involves a higher fixed cost in terms of the salaries of its managers.
We can decompose the total log change in average wages in the firm into two parts. The first
part is the change in wages of workers in existing layers, which, as we know, is negative by the
results discussed above. The second part is the change induced by adding a new agent at the top of
the hierarchy. Agents in the new added layer earn more than the average worker in the firm since
they are added, in the vast majority of cases, to the top layer. For example, for firms that transition
from zero to one layer of management, the new manager in layer one makes 53.1% more than the
average wage in the firm before reorganization. This number can be much higher for larger firms.
Firms that go from 2 to 3 layers pay the new top manager 335.7% more than the average worker
in the firm before adding the layer. All of these results are presented in Table 16. We decompose
the average wage in the firm, d ln w̄Lit, as
















L′it+1 is the wage of the new top manager, and s is the fraction of hours of work done
by employees in pre-existing layers. Table 16 presents each of these components. The fact that
w̄`≤LL′it+1/w̄Lit is below one for all transitions is, for practical purposes, just a re-expression of the
results in Table 15. The upper-right panel shows the earnings of the top managers as a fraction
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of the average wage in the firm before transition. Clearly, since workers in pre-existing layers earn
less, but the new top manager makes more, the overall effect of adding a layer is ambiguous and not
particularly robust. The relevant finding is that new managers are the only ones in the reorganized
firm who earn more after adding layers.
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All results from trimmed sample at 0.05%. *significant at 10%, ** at 1%. Number of obs. in parenthesis.
The results in this section suggest that in order to understand the behavior of firms that expand,
it is essential to condition on whether the expansion requires a reorganization. On average, the
firms that expand the most tend to reorganize. So to understand expansions we need to understand
reorganization. The salient fact in the data is that when firms expand and reorganize they pay
workers on pre-existing layers on average less. This is consistent with the view, borrowed from
the theory in CRH, that the firm wants less knowledgeable workers on pre-existing layers after the
reorganization. Note that this finding does not challenge the many empirical studies (Abowd, et
al. 1999, Brown and Medoff 1989, Oi and Idson 1999, Bernard and Jensen 1997, 1999, Frias, et
al. 2009) that have found that average firm wages (or the wages of a particular class of workers)
increase with firm size or as firms expand. In fact, we find some evidence that this is true in our
sample too. What our finding says is that this is not the case when we condition on the firm
reorganizing by adding layers. Furthermore, we find that a substantial fraction of expansions are
in fact paired with this type of reorganization.
One might be concerned that the results presented above are just driven by a reclassification
of agents across occupations. For example, as the firm expands the oldest and best paid worker
might be now called a floor supervisor and since she has the highest wage, this relabeling results in
a lowering of the average wage of the agents that remain as workers in layer zero. This relabeling
of jobs would show up in our results as a firm that added a layer and reduced the average wage in
pre-existing layers, even though the actual distribution of wages within the firm has not changed.
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To address this potential concern we look at the change in the distribution of wages within the firm
after a reorganization.
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Figure 8: Difference in the distribution of wages after minus before the transition
Figure 8 presents the difference in the log wages at each percentile of the distribution for the
different one-layer transitions.9 The figure also shows a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
constructed as we explain in Appendix B. First note that the distribution of wages in firms that
transition actually changes significantly. This eliminates the concern that our results are just the
result of meaningless relabeling of employees. Furthermore, note how wages in the lower part of
the distribution fall for all transitions where firms add layers and they increase when firms drop
them; exactly as we have been arguing.
Figure 8 also shows that, in some transitions, at the upper tail of the distribution wages rise
when firms add layers and fall when they drop them. This was expected given the results in Table 16
where we show that agents in the newly added layer make more money than the average employee
in the firm before the transition. Still, to confirm that this is in fact driven by the agents hired at
the new layer, in Figure 9 we present a parallel figure without including the hours of work in the
new layer (or the dropped layer). The results are very stark and consistent with our interpretation.
In all transitions where the firms add (drop) a layer we observe a shift down (up) in the distribution
of wages after the transition. In fact, the largest changes in the distribution are now observed at
the upper tail of the distribution. This was expected from the results in Table 15, that indicate
that average wages in the upper pre-existing layers are the ones that fall the most when firms add
a layer.
9Transitions of more than one layer look similar and we omit them for brevity.
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Figure 9: Difference in the distribution of wages in pre-existing layers after minus before the transition
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Figure 10: Difference in the distribution of wages for firms
that do not transition conditioning on d lnV A > 0
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These results are particularly meaningful when contrasted with Figure 10 where we present
the difference in the log wages at each percentile of the distribution for firms that expand without
reorganizing.10 As before, the distribution of wages changes significantly. However, now the distri-
bution of wages shifts up significantly at all percentiles of the distribution. So, as expected from the
layer-level results above, the distribution of wages of firms that grow and reorganize shifts down for
preexisting hours of work, while the distribution of wages of firms that grow without reorganizing
shifts up.11 These results underscore how, even if one is not interested in layer-level outcomes,
conditioning on reorganization is essential to understand firm growth and its implications for wages
and the characteristics of a firm’s labor force.
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Figure 11: Representative transitions between firms with 0 and 1 layers
We finish this section with a graphical illustration of firm transitions and the representative
changes in wages and normalized hours that result from those transitions. Figures 11 to 13 showcase
the results. The main characteristics of these changes have been analyzed before and are consistent
with the first 4 implications of the theory in Section 2. The top row shows a representative firm
that adds a layer and the bottom row a firm that drops a layer. The figure emphasizes the dramatic
changes associated with reorganizations in the data.
10Again, bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are included in the figure and an explanation of how we constructed
the figure is presented in Appendix B.
11 In Figure A12 in Appendix A we present the change in the distribution of wages conditioning on firms that
contract. In this case the distribution shifts down, as expected from the theory and the layer-level outcomes, for all
percentiles in firms with 2 and 3 layers and for most percentiles in firms with 0 and 1 layers. In the case of 0 and 1
layer firms wages at the very top of the distribution increase. This might be the result of some rent extraction by
top managers and owners before firms exit.
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Figure 12: Representative transitions between firms with 1 and 2 layers
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Figure 13: Representative transitions between firms with 2 and 3 layers
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We could also illustrate how firms respond to an expansion of, say, 5% in value added. In
that case we can also illustrate what happens with the firms that do not add layers (which we
know increase normalized hours and wages). We present these results in Figures A10 and A11 in
Appendix A. In the next section we explore a particular form of a firm’s expansion and its resulting
reorganization. Namely, we study firms that start to export goods to serve foreign markets.
5 Reorganizing to Export
It is well known by now that exporters are larger in terms of value added and employment (see
Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and Bernard, et al., 2007, among others). This is clearly the case in our
data as well.12 They also pay slightly higher wages. As Table 17 shows, they have more layers of
management as well. The average number of layers of management among non-exporters is 1.23,
meaning that the average exporter has a layer of workers, a layer of management and a fraction of
a second layer of management. If we look at exporters, they have 1.96 layers of management on
average. Hence, Implication 5 of the theory in Section 2 is confirmed by the data.
Table 17: Description of exporters
Average
VA Hours Wage # of layers
Non-exporters 800 29,026 23.03 1.23
Exporters 5,343 141,615 23.39 1.96
See the footnote in Table 2. The difference in wages is significant at 1%.
About 44% of the firms in our data export, and they account for slightly more than 83% of
value added, with some variation across years. More relevant for our purposes is that the firms that
export tend to have more layers. As Table 18 shows, of the firms with three layers of management,
71.6% of them export, while for firms with only workers, only 18.9% of them export.
Table 18: Share of exporters by number of layers





These numbers are expected given that from Section 3 we know that larger firms have more
layers, and from Table 17 and the vast literature on exporting, we know that larger firms export.
12Part of our data is used in Eaton, et al. (2011) to study the exporting behavior of firms. As a result, some of
these facts for France are known from their paper. However, they have no results on layers or firm reorganization
conditional on changing or keeping constant the number of layers.
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Table 19 presents the composition of firms by number of layers. Out of all exporters, only 7.5%
have only a layer of workers, while 42.6% have two layers of management, and 30.4% have three.
So, as shown in Table 19, there is substantial heterogeneity in the number of layers of exporters
and non-exporters. Furthermore, most exporters have many layers, while most non-exporters have
only one or two.
Table 19: Composition of firms by number of layers






We now focus on firms that become exporters during the period in our sample: new exporters.
New exporters are more likely to add layers than non-exporters. Table 20 shows that the proba-
bility of adding one or more layers for new exporters is significantly higher than for non-exporters,
regardless of the initial count of layers. The probability of keeping the same number of layers goes
down if the firm has zero or one layer of management, while the probability of keeping the same
number of layers increases for firms with two or three layers. Given that firms with three layers
cannot add layers, this is natural. We conclude from this evidence that new exporters tend to
add layers, consistent with Implication 6a of the theory. Of course, there are some that also drop
layers, but there are fewer of those firms than among firms that do not start to export. Table A5
in Appendix A shows that firms that exit the export market are more likely to drop layers than
exporters that do not exit.
Table 20: Layer transitions for new exporters relative to non-exporters
# of layers at t+ 1
0 1 2 3
0 -9.43 6.61 2.31 0.51
# of layers 1 -2.57 -3.49 5.29 0.77
at t 2 -0.87 -4.83 2.84 2.87
3 -0.18 -2.20 -2.45 4.83
All significant at 1%.
In fact, the new exporters that add layers expand on average much more than the ones that do
not reorganize. Table 21 shows the changes in hours, normalized hours, value added and average
wages for all new exporters, the ones that add layers, and the ones that do not change L. The
table is similar to Table 13, which we analyzed in the previous section, but it limits the sample
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to new exporters only. Table A4 in Appendix A presents the results for firms that exit the export
market. As in Table 13 we present results when we detrend using trends for all firms in the economy
(not only new exporters, of course). Firms that start exporting increase value added on average
by 3.8%. The ones that add layers increase value added by much more, 11.6%, while the ones
that do not change layers increase value added by only 3.3%. We find similar numbers for hours
and normalized hours. Namely, new exporters that add layers expand much more than firms that
do not add layers.Now let’s look at wages. After detrending, new exporters pay wages similar to
those paid before; so do firms that do not change layers. In contrast, firms that change layers
decrease wages by a significant 1.8%. Perhaps more relevant is that this average change masks a
composition effect between the new top manager and pre-existing layers. When we focus on wages
of employees in pre-existing layers, we find that wages fall by 11.9% in firms that add layers (13.9%
if we detrend), while they increase by 2.1% in firms that do not change layers (although the change
is insignificant when we detrend).
Table 21: Behavior of firms that enter the export market
All Increase L No change in L
d ln total hours 0.021*** 0.126*** 0.015***





L 0.008 1.237*** 0.024***
- detrended 0.019** 1.248*** 0.035***
d lnV A 0.038*** 0.116*** 0.033***
- detrended 0.046*** 0.125*** 0.041***
d ln avg wage 0.018*** 0.000 0.021***
- detrended -0.000 -0.018** 0.003
- common layers 0.018*** -0.119*** 0.021***
- - detrended -0.002 -0.139*** 0.001
% firms 100 14.62 70.61
% V A change 100 18.62 73.66
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
The results paint a picture consistent with the one presented in the previous section. New
exporters that reorganize reduce wages in pre-existing layers. Furthermore, these are the new
exporters that actually expand significantly. The firms that add layers account for 14.62% of new
exporters and 18.62% of the total increase in value added by new exporters. In sum, many firms
expand little when they become exporters; these firms increase the salaries of all their employees.
Some firms expand a lot when they start to export. They reorganize, add layers, and pay lower
wages to employees in the pre-existing layers and higher than average wages to the new top manager.
We now proceed to verify that these results hold layer by layer. We look first at firms that do
not add layers. As in the previous section, we estimate the regression in equation (6) for the change
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in normalized hours. The only difference is that now we use only firms that either start to export
or stop exporting in the year in which we measure the change in normalized hours. The results for
β`L are presented in Table 22. Many of these estimates are not significant. The ones that are are
positive as predicted by the theory. As we showed using Table 21, the firms that do not add layers
expand very little, so it is hard to estimate β`L precisely enough to have significant results.
Table 22: Firms that change export status and do not change L
# of layers Layer β`L s.e. p-value obs
1 0 -0.011 0.035 0.76 6,968
2 0 0.017 0.024 0.47 10,507
2 1 -0.015 0.027 0.58 10,507
3 0 0.200 0.053 0.00 4,896
3 1 0.073 0.038 0.06 4,896
3 2 0.084 0.042 0.05 4,896
The results for wages using equation (7) for the sample of firms that change export status are
presented in Table 23. Now the estimates are much more significant and robust. All the values
of γ`L are positive and significant and they tend to increase with ` given L. The ranking of the
elasticities is not always significant, but it is in most cases, and when it is, it corresponds to the
one predicted by the theory. Namely, the wage of the higher-level managers expands proportionally
more than that of the lower-level ones. Hence, Implication 6b is also corroborated by the evidence.
Table 23: Firms that change export status and do not change L
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.108 0.022 0.00 3,263
1 0 0.110 0.016 0.00 6,968
1 1 0.119 0.018 0.00 6,968
2 0 0.169 0.017 0.00 10,507
2 1 0.186 0.018 0.00 10,507
2 2 0.193 0.019 0.00 10,507
3 0 0.199 0.033 0.00 4,896
3 1 0.219 0.034 0.00 4,896
3 2 0.218 0.034 0.00 4,896
3 3 0.219 0.035 0.00 4,896
The final prediction of the theory to contrast with our data is Implication 6c, which states that
new exporters that add layers decrease w`L and increase n
`
L at all `. We have already argued in
the previous section that firms that add layers decrease wages and increase hours at all layers, and
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Table 20 shows that new exporters tend to add layers. So it is natural to expect that in fact the
predictions of the theory will be corroborated by the data.
Table 24: d lnn`Lit for i
′s that transition and change export status
# of layers Layer Change s.e. p-value obs
Before After
0 1 0 1.482 0.074 0.00 528
0 2 0 1.536 0.195 0.00 95
0 3 0 2.990 0.289 0.00 15
1 0 0 -1.482 0.084 0.00 520
1 2 0 0.670 0.046 0.00 1132
1 2 1 0.584 0.045 0.00 1132
1 3 0 0.936 0.175 0.00 91
1 3 1 0.907 0.149 0.00 91
2 0 0 -1.561 0.213 0.00 100
2 1 0 -0.600 0.046 0.00 1119
2 1 1 -0.438 0.048 0.00 1119
2 3 0 1.070 0.049 0.00 861
2 3 1 1.006 0.057 0.00 861
2 3 2 0.877 0.056 0.00 861
3 0 0 -2.900 0.304 0.00 16
3 1 0 -1.162 0.161 0.00 105
3 1 1 -0.880 0.156 0.00 105
3 2 0 -1.228 0.056 0.00 872
3 2 1 -1.159 0.061 0.00 872
3 2 2 -1.045 0.059 0.00 872
Table 24 presents the average log change in the number of hours for all transitions and all layers.
The table is similar to Table 14, but it uses the sample of firms that enter the export market and
add layers and firms that exit the export market and drop layers. The results establish that, for
all transitions and layers, firms that add layers increase the number of hours, while firms that drop
layers decrease them. The numbers are also extremely large. In the data there are 1,132 firms with
one layer of management that add a second layer and start to export. Our results indicate that
the average percentage change in the number of hours in layer zero is 95% (exp(0.67)) and 74% in
layer one. So new exporters with one layer of management that add a new layer almost double in
employment size. Some transitions are smaller and some even larger. However, all of them tend to
be fairly large and the effects are extremely significant and robust.
The next step is to look at wages. Again, we study the change in average log wages for all
transitions and layers for the sample of new exporters that add layers and firms that exit the export
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market and drop layers. The results are displayed in Table 25. The prediction in Implication 6c is
broadly corroborated by the data (although the change in log wages in ` = 0 for transitions from
2 to 3 layers is not significant). New exporters that add layers decrease wages and the firms that
exit the export market and drop layers increase wages. As we show in Table 20, new exporters
tend to add more layers than non-exporters. Similarly firms that exit the export market tend to
drop more layers than exporters. Again, Appendix A tables A34 to A36, A38 and A41 show several
robustness checks for firms that transition and for firms that do not transition, using only firms
with adjacent layers and DADS wages.
Table 25: d lnw`Lit for i
′s that transition and change export status
# of layers Layer Change s.e. p-value obs
Before After
0 1 0 -0.144 0.022 0.00 528
0 2 0 -0.593 0.108 0.00 95
0 3 0 -1.031 0.353 0.01 15
1 0 0 0.219 0.026 0.00 520
1 2 0 -0.025 0.010 0.01 1132
1 2 1 -0.232 0.015 0.00 1132
1 3 0 -0.158 0.043 0.00 91
1 3 1 -0.334 0.056 0.00 91
2 0 0 0.524 0.088 0.00 100
2 1 0 0.074 0.010 0.00 1119
2 1 1 0.247 0.015 0.00 1119
2 3 0 0.004 0.011 0.67 861
2 3 1 -0.043 0.013 0.00 861
2 3 2 -0.165 0.017 0.00 861
3 0 0 0.769 0.346 0.04 16
3 1 0 0.126 0.049 0.01 105
3 1 1 0.465 0.073 0.00 105
3 2 0 0.023 0.009 0.01 872
3 2 1 0.051 0.012 0.00 872
3 2 2 0.169 0.016 0.00 872
So exporters tend to reduce wages as a result of adding layers. To continue with our previous
example, a new exporter that had one layer of management and added another as a result of its
decision to start exporting reduces the wages of its workers in layer zero by 2.5%, and the wage
of managers in layer one declines by 26%. In contrast, as Table 26 (discussed below) shows, the
newly hired second layer manager earns 97.5% more than the average wage in the firm before the
change. Appendix A shows robustness checks with the alternative wage database.
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The result should change our view on the distribution of the gains from exporting. The view
that new exporters pay higher wages is flawed. Most new exporters expand little and do not
change their organization. They hire more hours and pay higher wages. The new exporters that
expand substantially add layers of management. They hire substantially more workers but pay
these workers less (since according to the theory they also know less). The new exporters that
expand and add layers exhibit more dispersion in wages within the firm.
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All results from trimmed sample at 0.05%. * significant at 5%, ** at 1%. Number of obs. in parenthesis.
Table 26 shows the same decomposition we showed in Table 16 in the previous section. It
separates the change in wages in the firm in the contribution to the average of the new top manager
and the change in the wage of the pre-existing layers. The top left panel shows that the average
wage of all existing layers decreases as firms add layers (and we know from Table 25 that it decreased
for each layer individually). The top right panel shows the wage of the new top manager relative
to the mean wage of the firm before the change. Clearly, wage dispersion in the firm increases
substantially when it starts to export and adds layers.
We end this section as we did the last one, with a graphical representation of the change in
firms as they become exporters. Figures 14 to 16 show the organization of firms that had zero, one,
or two layers of management before they became exporters. The first row in each graph represents
the old and new organization when the firm adds layers and starts to export. The second row
represents the organization when the firm starts to export but keeps constant the number of layers.
Perhaps the most striking observation coming out of Figures 14 to 16 is how little firms change
when they do not add layers compared to when they do. Hopefully, these figures are convincing
in showing that new exporters expand by adding layers, adding employment, and reducing wages.
The reduction in wages challenges, as far as we know, all theories of trade that do not add explicit
organizational choices.
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Figure 14: Representative new exporters with L = 0
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Figure 15: Representative new exporters with L = 1
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Figure 16: Representative new exporters with L = 2
6 How Do Firms Change the Average Wage in a Layer?
The theory in CRH is useful as a guide into the optimal behavior of firms at the level of a layer.
However, it is silent about how firms achieve any change in hours, average knowledge, or average
wages in a layer when they face costs or restrictions to adjust freely. For example, how do they
manage to lower the average wages in pre-existing layers conditional on the institutional environ-
ment in which they operate? The answer to this question will surely be specific to the particular
characteristics of the French labor market. As such, it is interesting for learning something about
France, but not necessarily about firms in general. This is why this question is not a central concern
of our paper. Our conclusions and the interpretation of our findings is not affected by the answer
to this question. Still, we want to make sure that it is not impossible for firms to do what we are
arguing they are, in fact, doing. Of course, we know that labor market frictions, institutions, and
regulations make reducing the wage of a particular employee complicated, if not impossible. So
how can the prediction that firms that add layers reduce average wages in pre-existing layers be so
clearly present in our data?
The data we use is very detailed in that they allow us to observe hierarchical occupations
together with wages at the occupation level for most manufacturing firms. To study how reorgani-
zation affects layer-level average wages, we track hours of work, and their average hourly wage, as
they enter, stay, or leave the layer during a transition.13 Studying these transitions we find that
13See description of Tables A43 to A46 in the appendix for a detailed account of this excercise and findings.
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firms reduce wages by promoting or firing the highest paid hours of work in a layer and by hiring
new hours of work that are paid less. They keep the salaries of hours of work that stay in the layer
essentially unchanged, although in some cases they raise them slightly.14 This reduces the average
wage in the layer. That is, the adjustment happens via an extensive margin. Firms adjust the
composition of the employees in the layer and not the individual wages that they command.
This way of adjusting the level of knowledge and wages in a layer clearly reflects the presence
of some form of downward wage rigidities. Hence, the reductions we observe in the average wages
of pre-existing layer in firms that add layers necessarily understate the reductions that we would
observe absent these frictions. Similar empirical explorations in other, more flexible, labor markets
would shed light on the importance of this argument.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides the first anatomy of organizations using a large scale dataset. Previous studies
focused on particular details of the organization and included only a few hundred firms. In contrast,
we use virtually all the manufacturing firms in France during the period 2002-2007. To study the
organization of these producers and how they modify their organization, we use occupational data
to classify workers in layers. The concept of a layer of employees and our empirical implementation
using hierarchical occupations have proven enormously useful in analyzing these data. First, firms
actively manage the number of layers in the firm. Firms expand by adding them and contract by
dropping them. Furthermore, exporters that expand substantially do so by adding layers.
We find that the organization of labor in the firm depends dramatically on the number of layers.
In our data, studying the behavior of hours of work or wages in a firm without classifying workers
in layers and conditioning on changes in these layers results in ambiguous firm-level effects that are
hard to understand and not robust. In contrast, once we classify workers in layers, the behavior
of wages and hours of work for each layer is easy to understand through the lens of a theory of
hierarchical organization, such as the one in CRH (which borrows the technology from Garicano,
2000). Firms that expand without adding layers increase hours at all layers as well as average wages
at all layers. They essentially behave the way most theories would suggest expanding firms behave.
In contrast, firms that add layers (for example, because they start to export) expand much more,
add many hours of work to all layers, but reduce average wages in all pre-existing layers. The fact
that the wages of all pre-existing layers go down is, as far as we know, a novel empirical finding.
Furthermore, it is hard to rationalize with theories that do not have the organization of knowledge
at their core.15 The evidence we provide is extremely robust and needs to be confronted by all
14Tables A43 to A46 in the appendix present these results for all transitions. Table A43 shows that the results
for hours that stay in the layer are small and not particularly systematic, so they do not dominate the effect on
the average wage in a layer. In contrast, Table A44 shows that the wages of hours that enter the layer are always
significantly lower than the wages of hours that leave the layer (and vice-versa for firms that drop layers, except for
layer 0 in firms that go from 3 to 2 layers of management).
15Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Qian (1994) present theories were effi ciency wages decrease as the span of control
is reduced. However, these theories assume a fixed organizational form and so are silent about the way in which
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existing and future theories of firm dynamics and export behavior.
Our results also have implications for the distribution of wages within the firm and how this
distribution changes as firms expand or start to export. Since most large expansions are done
through reorganization via new layers, firm growth and export behavior lead to increases in the
range of wages within the firm. This is the case because the new managers in firms that add layers
make much more than the average employee before the change.
It is important to be clear about the way in which our results should be interpreted. Our study
has identified patterns in the data and clear robust correlations between organizational change and
a variety of firm characteristics, like the distribution of employees across layers and their wages.
The patterns we uncover are useful to discriminate between theories of firm growth and their
implications for labor market outcomes. They establish a set of facts that theories of firms and
wages should relate to in the future. What we have not done in this paper is to identify exogenous
shocks that lead to reorganization. So our findings cannot be used to compute, say, the size of the
effect of a trade liberalization on the wages paid by firms, or the number and types of the workers
they hire. This analysis could easily be done in a country where such a shock is clearly identifiable.
Our empirical analysis of firms’organization can be replicated easily for any country that has
data on wages by occupation at the firm level. This opens the possibility of studying how firm’
organization affects a variety of economic phenomena. Hopefully, our paper will convince others of
the importance and relevance of this endeavor.
growing firms reorganize and, as a result, change the number of employees and wages at each layer.
40
References
[1] Abowd, J., F. Kramarz, and D. Margolis (1999). “High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms,”
Econometrica, 67:2, 251-333.
[2] Bernard, A. B. and J. B. Jensen, (1995). “Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing:
1976-1987,”Brookings Papers in Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 67-112.
[3] Bernard, A. B. and J. B. Jensen, (1997). “Exporters, Skill Upgrading and the Wage Gap,”
Journal of International Economics, 42, 3-31.
[4] Bernard, A. B. and J. B. Jensen, (1999). “Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect,
or Both?,”Journal of International Economics, 47:1, 1-25.
[5] Bernard, A. B, J. B. Jensen, S. Redding and P. Schott, (2007). “Firms in International Trade,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21:3, 105-130.
[6] Brown, C. and J. Medoff (1989). “The Employer Size-Wage Effect,”Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 97:5, 1027-1059.
[7] Caliendo, L. and E. Rossi-Hansberg, (2012). “The Impact of Trade on Organization and Pro-
ductivity,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[8] Calvo, G. A., and S.Wellisz, (1978). “Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of
the Firm,”Journal of Political Economy, 86:5, 943-952.
[9] Caroli E., and J. van Reenen, (2001).“Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence From A
Panel Of British And French Establishments,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116:4, 1449-
1492.
[10] Eaton, J., S. Kortum, and F. Kramarz (2011). “An Anatomy of International Trade: Evidence
from French Firms,”Econometrica, 79:5, 1453-1498.
[11] Eaton, J., S. Kortum, F. Kramarz, and R. Sampognaro, (2011). “Dissecting the French Export
Wage Premium,”Working Paper.
[12] Egger, H., and U. Kreickemeier, (2009). “Firm Heterogeneity and the Labor Market Effects of
Trade Liberalisation,”International Economic Review, 50: 187-216.
[13] Felbermayr, G., J. Prat, and H. Schmerer, (2008). “Globalization and Labor Market Outcomes:
Bargaining, Search Frictions, and Firm Heterogeneity,”IZA discussion paper no. 3363.
[14] Frías, J., D. S. Kaplan and E. A. Verhoogen, (2009). “Exports and Wage Premia: Evidence
from Mexican Employer-Employee Data.”Working paper.
[15] Garicano, L., (2000). “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,”Journal
of Political Economy, 108:5, 874-904.
41
[16] Garicano, L. and T.N. Hubbard, (2007). “Managerial Leverage Is Limited by the Size of
the Market: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 50: 1-44.
[17] Garicano, L. and E. Rossi-Hansberg, (2006). “Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge
Economy,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121:4, 1383-1435.
[18] Guadalupe, M., and J. Wulf, (2010). “The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition:
The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Corporate Hierarchies,”American Economic Journal :
Applied Economics, 2:4, 105-27.
[19] Helpman, E., O. Itskhoki, and S. Redding, (2010). “Inequality and Unemployment in a Global
Economy,”Econometrica, 78: 1239-1283.
[20] Lentz, R. and D. T. Mortensen, (2008). “An Empirical Model of Growth Through Product
Innovation,”Econometrica, 76:6, 1317-1373.
[21] Melitz, M. J., (2003). “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,”Econometrica, 71:6, 1695—1725.
[22] Oi, W. and Idson, T. (1999). “Firm Size and Wages,”Handbook of Labor Economics: Volume
3, O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Elsevier Science: Amsterdam, 2165-2214.
[23] Qian, Y. (1994). “Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy,”Review of Economic
Studies, 61:3, 527-544.
[24] Rajan, R. G. and J. Wulf, (2006). “The Flattening Firm: Evidence on the Changing Nature
of Firm Hierarchies from Panel Data,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 88:4, 759-773.
[25] Verhoogen, E. A., (2008). “Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican















0 lyrs 1 lyr 2 lyrs 3 lyrs
Kernel density estimate
Raw data − 2005 euros













0 lyrs 1 lyr 2 lyrs 3 lyrs
Kernel density estimate
After removing industry and year FE − 2005 euros
Firm hourly wage distribution by number of layers
















1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Value added (log scale)
out of sample to 1 lyr to 2 lyrs to 3 lyrs
















1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Value added (log scale)
out of sample to 0 lyrs to 2 lyrs to 3 lyrs
















1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Value added (log scale)
out of sample to 0 lyrs to 1 lyr to 3 lyrs
















1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Value added (log scale)
out of sample to 0 lyrs to 1 lyr to 2 lyrs
Transitions of firms out of 3 layers
Figure A2: Transitions across layers depend on value added
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Figure A3: Normalized hours vs. firm value added among 1 layer firms
Figure A4: Normalized hours vs. firm value added among 2 layer firms
Figure A5: Normalized hours vs. firm value added among 3 layer firms
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Figure A6: Wages vs. firm value added among 1 layer firms
Figure A7: Wages vs. firm value added among 2 layer firms
Figure A8: Wages vs. firm value added among 3 layer firms
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Figure A9: Wages vs. firm value added among 4 layer firms
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After a positive 5%  shock
Figure A10: Transition after a 5% positive α shock
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After a negative 5%  shock
Figure A11: Transition after a 5% negative α shock
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Figure A12: Difference in the distribution of wages for firms
that do not transition conditioning on d lnV A < 0
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Table A1: Data description by number of layers in the firm, DADS wages
# of Average Median
layers Firm-years VA Hours Wage* wage
0 81,909 205 7,946 11.69 10.18
1 126,069 403 16,450 13.19 12.08
2 161,449 2,821 85,674 15.12 14.22
3 87,211 8,879 227,070 16.67 15.71
Value added in 000s of 2005 euros. Wage* = average hourly wage in 2005
euros from trimmed sample (0.05% top and bottom in each cell).
Table A2: % of firms that transition to an adjacent layer
Conditioning on firms with adjacent layers
# of layers
0 1 2 3
Transition up 75.4 82.9 100 -
Transition down - 91.3 60.3 75.9
Table A3: Distribution of layers at t+ 1 conditional on layers at t, weighted by V A
# of layers at t+ 1
Exit 0 1 2 3 Total
0 11.9 64.1 19.6 3.7 0.7 100
# of layers 1 7.2 6.6 62.2 21.7 2.2 100
at t 2 5.8 0.2 2.5 72.6 19.0 100
3 7.7 0.0 0.2 13.3 78.8 100
48
Table A4: Behavior of firms that exit the export market
All Increase L No change in L
d ln total hours -0.027*** -0.147*** -0.017***





L -0.009 -1.251*** 0.018***
- detrended 0.002 -1.239*** 0.029***
d lnV A -0.046*** -0.124*** -0.035***
- detrended -0.038*** -0.115*** -0.028***
d ln avg wage 0.006*** 0.027*** 0.008***
- detrended -0.012*** -0.010 -0.010***
- common layers -0.010*** 0.154*** 0.008***
- - detrended -0.010*** 0.134*** -0.012***
% firms 100 15.46 70.68
% V A change 100 20.28 76.01
*** significant at 1%.
Table A5: Layer transitions for firms that stop exporting relative to exporters
# of layers at t+ 1
0 1 2 3
0 2.85*** -1.8* -0.95** -0.10
# of layers 1 1.29 1.09*** -2.00*** -0.38*
at t 2 0.66*** 6.02*** -4.41*** -2.27***
3 0.35*** 1.87*** 6.61*** -8.83***
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Change in normalized hours for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Table A6 Table A7






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.514  0.024  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  1.724  0.071  0.00  760 
0  3  0  2.652  0.251  0.00  71 
1  0  0  ‐1.531  0.023  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  0.716  0.016  0.00  9211 
1  2  1  0.542  0.016  0.00  9211 
1  3  0  1.233  0.064  0.00  638 
1  3  1  1.039  0.064  0.00  638 
2  0  0  ‐1.756  0.057  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  ‐0.693  0.016  0.00  9739 
2  1  1  ‐0.529  0.017  0.00  9739 
2  3  0  1.346  0.020  0.00  7482 
2  3  1  1.279  0.021  0.00  7482 
2  3  2  1.166  0.022  0.00  7482 
3  0  0  ‐2.296  0.171  0.00  85 
3  1  0  ‐1.155  0.054  0.00  858 
3  1  1  ‐1.025  0.051  0.00  858 
3  2  0  ‐1.390  0.019  0.00  8186 
3  2  1  ‐1.305  0.021  0.00  8186 
3  2  2  ‐1.239  0.020  0.00  8186 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.499  0.030  0.00  3717 
0  2  0  1.745  0.082  0.00  583 
0  3  0  2.863  0.291  0.00  50 
1  0  0  ‐1.518  0.027  0.00  4562 
1  2  0  0.768  0.019  0.00  6231 
1  2  1  0.546  0.020  0.00  6231 
1  3  0  1.347  0.079  0.00  423 
1  3  1  1.020  0.078  0.00  423 
2  0  0  ‐1.709  0.062  0.00  806 
2  1  0  ‐0.730  0.020  0.00  6642 
2  1  1  ‐0.536  0.020  0.00  6642 
2  3  0  1.335  0.024  0.00  4758 
2  3  1  1.248  0.026  0.00  4758 
2  3  2  1.118  0.026  0.00  4758 
3  0  0  ‐2.210  0.181  0.00  69 
3  1  0  ‐1.242  0.063  0.00  615 
3  1  1  ‐1.052  0.060  0.00  615 
3  2  0  ‐1.426  0.023  0.00  5401 
3  2  1  ‐1.331  0.025  0.00  5401 
3  2  2  ‐1.232  0.025  0.00  5401 
 
Table A8 Table A9










Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.463  0.024  0.00  5847 
0  2  0  1.690  0.066  0.00  875 
0  3  0  2.575  0.230  0.00  72 
1  0  0  ‐1.515  0.022  0.00  6775 
1  2  0  0.754  0.015  0.00  9338 
1  2  1  0.518  0.016  0.00  9338 
1  3  0  1.373  0.066  0.00  650 
1  3  1  1.026  0.062  0.00  650 
2  0  0  ‐1.728  0.053  0.00  1146 
2  1  0  ‐0.730  0.016  0.00  9998 
2  1  1  ‐0.517  0.016  0.00  9998 
2  3  0  1.311  0.019  0.00  7369 
2  3  1  1.218  0.021  0.00  7369 
2  3  2  1.099  0.021  0.00  7369 
3  0  0  ‐2.213  0.183  0.00  104 
3  1  0  ‐1.204  0.052  0.00  903 
3  1  1  ‐0.978  0.050  0.00  903 
3  2  0  ‐1.469  0.019  0.00  8416 
3  2  1  ‐1.378  0.021  0.00  8416 
3  2  2  ‐1.263  0.020  0.00  8416 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.520  0.017  0.00  10432 
0  2  0  1.745  0.053  0.00  1350 
0  3  0  2.312  0.193  0.00  111 
1  0  0  ‐1.585  0.017  0.00  11356 
1  2  0  1.105  0.012  0.00  13695 
1  2  1  0.803  0.013  0.00  13695 
1  3  0  1.436  0.047  0.00  1065 
1  3  1  1.157  0.047  0.00  1065 
2  0  0  ‐1.801  0.046  0.00  1698 
2  1  0  ‐1.160  0.012  0.00  14006 
2  1  1  ‐0.846  0.014  0.00  14006 
2  3  0  1.677  0.015  0.00  11947 
2  3  1  1.641  0.016  0.00  11947 
2  3  2  1.463  0.017  0.00  11947 
3  0  0  ‐2.203  0.157  0.00  142 
3  1  0  ‐1.359  0.039  0.00  1342 
3  1  1  ‐1.081  0.041  0.00  1342 
3  2  0  ‐1.794  0.014  0.00  12864 
3  2  1  ‐1.749  0.015  0.00  12864 
3  2  2  ‐1.574  0.016  0.00  12864 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in normalized hours for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Table A10






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.514  0.024  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  1.724  0.071  0.00  760 
0  3  0  2.652  0.251  0.00  71 
1  0  0  ‐1.531  0.023  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  1.076  0.016  0.00  7589 
1  2  1  0.767  0.018  0.00  7589 
1  3  0  1.389  0.064  0.00  595 
1  3  1  1.132  0.066  0.00  595 
2  0  0  ‐1.756  0.057  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  ‐1.139  0.016  0.00  7758 
2  1  1  ‐0.805  0.018  0.00  7758 
2  3  0  1.634  0.020  0.00  6459 
2  3  1  1.588  0.022  0.00  6459 
2  3  2  1.406  0.023  0.00  6459 
3  0  0  ‐2.296  0.171  0.00  85 
3  1  0  ‐1.421  0.051  0.00  770 
3  1  1  ‐1.165  0.053  0.00  770 
3  2  0  ‐1.730  0.019  0.00  6948 
3  2  1  ‐1.668  0.021  0.00  6948 
3  2  2  ‐1.511  0.022  0.00  6948 
 
Selected sample with adjacent layers
Table A11 Table A12






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.787  0.019  0.00  6788 
0  2  0  2.364  0.061  0.00  796 
0  3  0  2.650  0.200  0.00  75 
1  0  0  ‐1.841  0.019  0.00  7016 
1  2  0  1.244  0.017  0.00  8339 
1  2  1  1.087  0.017  0.00  8339 
1  3  0  1.654  0.062  0.00  594 
1  3  1  1.529  0.061  0.00  594 
2  0  0  ‐2.284  0.056  0.00  943 
2  1  0  ‐1.286  0.018  0.00  8204 
2  1  1  ‐1.158  0.018  0.00  8204 
2  3  0  1.844  0.017  0.00  10233 
2  3  1  1.838  0.018  0.00  10233 
2  3  2  1.678  0.018  0.00  10233 
3  0  0  ‐2.476  0.154  0.00  92 
3  1  0  ‐1.507  0.053  0.00  780 
3  1  1  ‐1.432  0.052  0.00  780 
3  2  0  ‐1.892  0.016  0.00  11614 
3  2  1  ‐1.866  0.017  0.00  11614 
3  2  2  ‐1.743  0.016  0.00  11614 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.824  0.025  0.00  3636 
0  2  0  2.351  0.083  0.00  446 
0  3  0  3.000  0.274  0.00  47 
1  0  0  ‐1.822  0.025  0.00  3845 
1  2  0  1.518  0.021  0.00  4134 
1  2  1  1.261  0.023  0.00  4134 
1  3  0  1.845  0.083  0.00  304 
1  3  1  1.671  0.085  0.00  304 
2  0  0  ‐2.214  0.072  0.00  567 
2  1  0  ‐1.606  0.023  0.00  3847 
2  1  1  ‐1.352  0.025  0.00  3847 
2  3  0  1.999  0.022  0.00  5111 
2  3  1  1.993  0.024  0.00  5111 
2  3  2  1.781  0.025  0.00  5111 
3  0  0  ‐2.434  0.198  0.00  56 
3  1  0  ‐1.679  0.064  0.00  426 
3  1  1  ‐1.593  0.065  0.00  426 
3  2  0  ‐2.049  0.021  0.00  5699 
3  2  1  ‐2.017  0.022  0.00  5699 
3  2  2  ‐1.851  0.022  0.00  5699 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in normalized hours for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Selected sample with adjacent layers
Table A13 Table A14






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.824  0.025  0.00  3636 
0  2  0  2.351  0.083  0.00  446 
0  3  0  3.000  0.274  0.00  47 
1  0  0  ‐1.822  0.025  0.00  3845 
1  2  0  1.248  0.023  0.00  4594 
1  2  1  1.100  0.023  0.00  4594 
1  3  0  1.709  0.087  0.00  319 
1  3  1  1.578  0.086  0.00  319 
2  0  0  ‐2.214  0.072  0.00  567 
2  1  0  ‐1.287  0.025  0.00  4331 
2  1  1  ‐1.157  0.024  0.00  4331 
2  3  0  1.840  0.023  0.00  5434 
2  3  1  1.824  0.024  0.00  5434 
2  3  2  1.657  0.025  0.00  5434 
3  0  0  ‐2.434  0.198  0.00  56 
3  1  0  ‐1.522  0.069  0.00  449 
3  1  1  ‐1.500  0.065  0.00  449 
3  2  0  ‐1.858  0.022  0.00  6123 
3  2  1  ‐1.821  0.023  0.00  6123 
3  2  2  ‐1.711  0.022  0.00  6123 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.854  0.030  0.00  2528 
0  2  0  2.516  0.092  0.00  335 
0  3  0  3.378  0.382  0.00  27 
1  0  0  ‐1.855  0.030  0.00  2623 
1  2  0  1.321  0.027  0.00  3099 
1  2  1  1.121  0.027  0.00  3099 
1  3  0  1.880  0.104  0.00  203 
1  3  1  1.594  0.105  0.00  203 
2  0  0  ‐2.205  0.080  0.00  407 
2  1  0  ‐1.338  0.031  0.00  2873 
2  1  1  ‐1.190  0.029  0.00  2873 
2  3  0  1.806  0.028  0.00  3450 
2  3  1  1.783  0.030  0.00  3450 
2  3  2  1.574  0.030  0.00  3450 
3  0  0  ‐2.341  0.207  0.00  40 
3  1  0  ‐1.550  0.079  0.00  316 
3  1  1  ‐1.492  0.073  0.00  316 
3  2  0  ‐1.883  0.027  0.00  4064 
3  2  1  ‐1.830  0.028  0.00  4064 
3  2  2  ‐1.683  0.027  0.00  4064 
 
Table A15 Table A16










Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.831  0.024  0.00  3888 
0  2  0  2.481  0.076  0.00  476 
0  3  0  3.127  0.288  0.00  38 
1  0  0  ‐1.846  0.024  0.00  3966 
1  2  0  1.309  0.022  0.00  4506 
1  2  1  1.092  0.022  0.00  4506 
1  3  0  1.832  0.083  0.00  307 
1  3  1  1.520  0.083  0.00  307 
2  0  0  ‐2.269  0.069  0.00  567 
2  1  0  ‐1.325  0.024  0.00  4322 
2  1  1  ‐1.163  0.024  0.00  4322 
2  3  0  1.784  0.022  0.00  5292 
2  3  1  1.759  0.024  0.00  5292 
2  3  2  1.550  0.024  0.00  5292 
3  0  0  ‐2.467  0.191  0.00  57 
3  1  0  ‐1.562  0.067  0.00  456 
3  1  1  ‐1.446  0.064  0.00  456 
3  2  0  ‐1.935  0.021  0.00  6356 
3  2  1  ‐1.887  0.022  0.00  6356 
3  2  2  ‐1.728  0.022  0.00  6356 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.787  0.019  0.00  6788 
0  2  0  2.364  0.061  0.00  796 
0  3  0  2.650  0.200  0.00  75 
1  0  0  ‐1.841  0.019  0.00  7016 
1  2  0  1.527  0.016  0.00  7445 
1  2  1  1.265  0.018  0.00  7445 
1  3  0  1.804  0.059  0.00  563 
1  3  1  1.628  0.061  0.00  563 
2  0  0  ‐2.284  0.056  0.00  943 
2  1  0  ‐1.610  0.017  0.00  7245 
2  1  1  ‐1.364  0.018  0.00  7245 
2  3  0  2.024  0.016  0.00  9549 
2  3  1  2.028  0.017  0.00  9549 
2  3  2  1.822  0.018  0.00  9549 
3  0  0  ‐2.476  0.154  0.00  92 
3  1  0  ‐1.674  0.049  0.00  736 
3  1  1  ‐1.539  0.051  0.00  736 
3  2  0  ‐2.080  0.015  0.00  10831 
3  2  1  ‐2.059  0.016  0.00  10831 
3  2  2  ‐1.883  0.016  0.00  10831 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in average wages for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Table A17 Table A18






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.113  0.007  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  ‐0.411  0.031  0.00  760 
0  3  0  ‐0.848  0.161  0.00  71 
1  0  0  0.199  0.007  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  ‐0.014  0.003  0.00  9211 
1  2  1  ‐0.211  0.005  0.00  9211 
1  3  0  ‐0.130  0.022  0.00  638 
1  3  1  ‐0.374  0.026  0.00  638 
2  0  0  0.481  0.028  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  0.061  0.004  0.00  9739 
2  1  1  0.246  0.005  0.00  9739 
2  3  0  0.019  0.003  0.00  7482 
2  3  1  ‐0.022  0.004  0.00  7482 
2  3  2  ‐0.152  0.006  0.00  7482 
3  0  0  1.018  0.156  0.00  85 
3  1  0  0.174  0.020  0.00  858 
3  1  1  0.397  0.023  0.00  858 
3  2  0  0.000  0.003  0.96  8186 
3  2  1  0.029  0.004  0.00  8186 
3  2  2  0.119  0.005  0.00  8186 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.210  0.009  0.00  3717 
0  2  0  ‐0.545  0.037  0.00  583 
0  3  0  ‐1.191  0.205  0.00  50 
1  0  0  0.313  0.009  0.00  4562 
1  2  0  ‐0.066  0.004  0.00  6231 
1  2  1  ‐0.263  0.006  0.00  6231 
1  3  0  ‐0.233  0.030  0.00  423 
1  3  1  ‐0.502  0.033  0.00  423 
2  0  0  0.639  0.034  0.00  806 
2  1  0  0.128  0.005  0.00  6642 
2  1  1  0.309  0.007  0.00  6642 
2  3  0  ‐0.019  0.004  0.00  4758 
2  3  1  ‐0.065  0.005  0.00  4758 
2  3  2  ‐0.200  0.007  0.00  4758 
3  0  0  1.265  0.179  0.00  69 
3  1  0  0.259  0.027  0.00  615 
3  1  1  0.478  0.028  0.00  615 
3  2  0  0.048  0.004  0.00  5401 
3  2  1  0.076  0.005  0.00  5401 
3  2  2  0.164  0.006  0.00  5401 
 
Table A19 Table A20










Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.276  0.007  0.00  5847 
0  2  0  ‐0.670  0.033  0.00  875 
0  3  0  ‐1.443  0.170  0.00  72 
1  0  0  0.338  0.007  0.00  6775 
1  2  0  ‐0.116  0.004  0.00  9338 
1  2  1  ‐0.320  0.005  0.00  9338 
1  3  0  ‐0.329  0.028  0.00  650 
1  3  1  ‐0.591  0.029  0.00  650 
2  0  0  0.708  0.029  0.00  1146 
2  1  0  0.158  0.004  0.00  9998 
2  1  1  0.342  0.005  0.00  9998 
2  3  0  ‐0.059  0.004  0.00  7369 
2  3  1  ‐0.109  0.004  0.00  7369 
2  3  2  ‐0.244  0.006  0.00  7369 
3  0  0  1.454  0.146  0.00  104 
3  1  0  0.300  0.022  0.00  903 
3  1  1  0.529  0.023  0.00  903 
3  2  0  0.079  0.003  0.00  8416 
3  2  1  0.108  0.004  0.00  8416 
3  2  2  0.197  0.005  0.00  8416 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.131  0.005  0.00  10432 
0  2  0  ‐0.432  0.024  0.00  1350 
0  3  0  ‐0.943  0.131  0.00  111 
1  0  0  0.201  0.005  0.00  11356 
1  2  0  ‐0.039  0.003  0.00  13695 
1  2  1  ‐0.202  0.004  0.00  13695 
1  3  0  ‐0.179  0.019  0.00  1065 
1  3  1  ‐0.411  0.021  0.00  1065 
2  0  0  0.489  0.022  0.00  1698 
2  1  0  0.080  0.003  0.00  14006 
2  1  1  0.213  0.004  0.00  14006 
2  3  0  ‐0.011  0.003  0.00  11947 
2  3  1  ‐0.046  0.003  0.00  11947 
2  3  2  ‐0.149  0.004  0.00  11947 
3  0  0  1.102  0.120  0.00  142 
3  1  0  0.192  0.016  0.00  1342 
3  1  1  0.395  0.018  0.00  1342 
3  2  0  0.032  0.003  0.00  12864 
3  2  1  0.048  0.003  0.00  12864 
3  2  2  0.112  0.004  0.00  12864 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in average wages for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Table A21






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.113  0.007  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  ‐0.411  0.031  0.00  760 
0  3  0  ‐0.848  0.161  0.00  71 
1  0  0  0.199  0.007  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  ‐0.011  0.004  0.01  7589 
1  2  1  ‐0.177  0.005  0.00  7589 
1  3  0  ‐0.139  0.023  0.00  595 
1  3  1  ‐0.375  0.027  0.00  595 
2  0  0  0.481  0.028  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  0.057  0.004  0.00  7758 
2  1  1  0.191  0.006  0.00  7758 
2  3  0  0.017  0.003  0.00  6459 
2  3  1  ‐0.015  0.004  0.00  6459 
2  3  2  ‐0.121  0.006  0.00  6459 
3  0  0  1.018  0.156  0.00  85 
3  1  0  0.181  0.022  0.00  770 
3  1  1  0.376  0.024  0.00  770 
3  2  0  0.003  0.004  0.42  6948 
3  2  1  0.020  0.004  0.00  6948 
3  2  2  0.083  0.005  0.00  6948 
 
Selected sample with adjacent layers
Table A22 Table A23






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.054  0.005  0.00  6788 
0  2  0  ‐0.188  0.024  0.00  796 
0  3  0  ‐0.414  0.120  0.00  75 
1  0  0  0.125  0.005  0.00  7016 
1  2  0  ‐0.013  0.003  0.00  8339 
1  2  1  ‐0.062  0.004  0.00  8339 
1  3  0  ‐0.098  0.021  0.00  594 
1  3  1  ‐0.147  0.023  0.00  594 
2  0  0  0.282  0.024  0.00  943 
2  1  0  0.061  0.004  0.00  8204 
2  1  1  0.103  0.004  0.00  8204 
2  3  0  ‐0.003  0.003  0.34  10233 
2  3  1  ‐0.016  0.003  0.00  10233 
2  3  2  ‐0.088  0.004  0.00  10233 
3  0  0  0.535  0.121  0.00  92 
3  1  0  0.161  0.019  0.00  780 
3  1  1  0.183  0.020  0.00  780 
3  2  0  0.026  0.003  0.00  11614 
3  2  1  0.026  0.003  0.00  11614 
3  2  2  0.072  0.004  0.00  11614 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.028  0.006  0.00  3636 
0  2  0  ‐0.161  0.030  0.00  446 
0  3  0  ‐0.297  0.132  0.03  47 
1  0  0  0.116  0.007  0.00  3845 
1  2  0  0.019  0.005  0.00  4134 
1  2  1  ‐0.029  0.005  0.00  4134 
1  3  0  ‐0.076  0.028  0.01  304 
1  3  1  ‐0.108  0.031  0.00  304 
2  0  0  0.277  0.032  0.00  567 
2  1  0  0.031  0.006  0.00  3847 
2  1  1  0.063  0.006  0.00  3847 
2  3  0  0.024  0.004  0.00  5111 
2  3  1  0.017  0.004  0.00  5111 
2  3  2  ‐0.048  0.005  0.00  5111 
3  0  0  0.458  0.147  0.00  56 
3  1  0  0.134  0.026  0.00  426 
3  1  1  0.153  0.027  0.00  426 
3  2  0  ‐0.005  0.004  0.24  5699 
3  2  1  ‐0.009  0.004  0.05  5699 
3  2  2  0.027  0.005  0.00  5699 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in average wages for firms that change layers (Robustness checks)
Selected sample with adjacent layers
Table A24 Table A25






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.028  0.006  0.00  3636 
0  2  0  ‐0.161  0.030  0.00  446 
0  3  0  ‐0.297  0.132  0.03  47 
1  0  0  0.116  0.007  0.00  3845 
1  2  0  0.016  0.004  0.00  4594 
1  2  1  ‐0.027  0.005  0.00  4594 
1  3  0  ‐0.072  0.027  0.01  319 
1  3  1  ‐0.099  0.030  0.00  319 
2  0  0  0.277  0.032  0.00  567 
2  1  0  0.039  0.005  0.00  4331 
2  1  1  0.073  0.006  0.00  4331 
2  3  0  0.025  0.004  0.00  5434 
2  3  1  0.015  0.004  0.00  5434 
2  3  2  ‐0.054  0.006  0.00  5434 
3  0  0  0.458  0.147  0.00  56 
3  1  0  0.132  0.025  0.00  449 
3  1  1  0.142  0.026  0.00  449 
3  2  0  ‐0.004  0.004  0.25  6123 
3  2  1  ‐0.007  0.004  0.09  6123 
3  2  2  0.031  0.005  0.00  6123 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.099  0.007  0.00  2528 
0  2  0  ‐0.244  0.035  0.00  335 
0  3  0  ‐0.566  0.211  0.01  27 
1  0  0  0.212  0.009  0.00  2623 
1  2  0  ‐0.031  0.006  0.00  3099 
1  2  1  ‐0.074  0.006  0.00  3099 
1  3  0  ‐0.168  0.038  0.00  203 
1  3  1  ‐0.219  0.040  0.00  203 
2  0  0  0.403  0.041  0.00  407 
2  1  0  0.104  0.007  0.00  2873 
2  1  1  0.133  0.008  0.00  2873 
2  3  0  ‐0.014  0.005  0.01  3450 
2  3  1  ‐0.024  0.006  0.00  3450 
2  3  2  ‐0.101  0.007  0.00  3450 
3  0  0  0.661  0.196  0.00  40 
3  1  0  0.217  0.033  0.00  316 
3  1  1  0.233  0.033  0.00  316 
3  2  0  0.045  0.005  0.00  4064 
3  2  1  0.042  0.005  0.00  4064 
3  2  2  0.082  0.006  0.00  4064 
 
Table A26 Table A27










Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.158  0.006  0.00  3888 
0  2  0  ‐0.349  0.035  0.00  476 
0  3  0  ‐0.880  0.205  0.00  38 
1  0  0  0.234  0.007  0.00  3966 
1  2  0  ‐0.081  0.005  0.00  4506 
1  2  1  ‐0.126  0.006  0.00  4506 
1  3  0  ‐0.260  0.035  0.00  307 
1  3  1  ‐0.328  0.036  0.00  307 
2  0  0  0.456  0.036  0.00  567 
2  1  0  0.133  0.006  0.00  4322 
2  1  1  0.166  0.006  0.00  4322 
2  3  0  ‐0.054  0.004  0.00  5292 
2  3  1  ‐0.066  0.005  0.00  5292 
2  3  2  ‐0.146  0.006  0.00  5292 
3  0  0  0.854  0.181  0.00  57 
3  1  0  0.281  0.029  0.00  456 
3  1  1  0.302  0.030  0.00  456 
3  2  0  0.078  0.004  0.00  6356 
3  2  1  0.075  0.004  0.00  6356 
3  2  2  0.118  0.005  0.00  6356 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.054  0.005  0.00  6788 
0  2  0  ‐0.188  0.024  0.00  796 
0  3  0  ‐0.414  0.120  0.00  75 
1  0  0  0.125  0.005  0.00  7016 
1  2  0  ‐0.010  0.004  0.01  7445 
1  2  1  ‐0.059  0.004  0.00  7445 
1  3  0  ‐0.101  0.022  0.00  563 
1  3  1  ‐0.151  0.024  0.00  563 
2  0  0  0.282  0.024  0.00  943 
2  1  0  0.053  0.004  0.00  7245 
2  1  1  0.093  0.004  0.00  7245 
2  3  0  ‐0.003  0.003  0.26  9549 
2  3  1  ‐0.013  0.003  0.00  9549 
2  3  2  ‐0.081  0.004  0.00  9549 
3  0  0  0.535  0.121  0.00  92 
3  1  0  0.159  0.020  0.00  736 
3  1  1  0.187  0.020  0.00  736 
3  2  0  0.026  0.003  0.00  10831 
3  2  1  0.023  0.003  0.00  10831 
3  2  2  0.066  0.004  0.00  10831 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.073  0.003  0.00  10432 
0  2  0  ‐0.172  0.011  0.00  1350 
0  3  0  ‐0.320  0.061  0.00  111 
1  0  0  0.100  0.003  0.00  11356 
1  2  0  ‐0.016  0.002  0.00  17052 
1  2  1  ‐0.220  0.003  0.00  17052 
1  3  0  ‐0.044  0.007  0.00  1168 
1  3  1  ‐0.295  0.014  0.00  1168 
2  0  0  0.181  0.009  0.00  1698 
2  1  0  0.044  0.001  0.00  17927 
2  1  1  0.234  0.003  0.00  17927 
2  3  0  0.009  0.001  0.00  14228 
2  3  1  ‐0.037  0.002  0.00  14228 
2  3  2  ‐0.168  0.004  0.00  14228 
3  0  0  0.274  0.044  0.00  142 
3  1  0  0.064  0.006  0.00  1493 
3  1  1  0.293  0.012  0.00  1493 
3  2  0  0.014  0.001  0.00  15303 
3  2  1  0.045  0.002  0.00  15303 
3  2  2  0.138  0.003  0.00  15303 
 
Table A29 Table A30






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.076  0.004  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  ‐0.178  0.015  0.00  760 
0  3  0  ‐0.370  0.081  0.00  71 
1  0  0  0.101  0.003  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  ‐0.017  0.002  0.00  9211 
1  2  1  ‐0.214  0.004  0.00  9211 
1  3  0  ‐0.037  0.010  0.00  638 
1  3  1  ‐0.281  0.019  0.00  638 
2  0  0  0.183  0.012  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  0.041  0.002  0.00  9739 
2  1  1  0.226  0.004  0.00  9739 
2  3  0  0.009  0.002  0.00  7482 
2  3  1  ‐0.032  0.003  0.00  7482 
2  3  2  ‐0.162  0.005  0.00  7482 
3  0  0  0.227  0.052  0.00  85 
3  1  0  0.064  0.009  0.00  858 
3  1  1  0.287  0.017  0.00  858 
3  2  0  0.014  0.002  0.00  8186 
3  2  1  0.043  0.003  0.00  8186 
3  2  2  0.133  0.005  0.00  8186 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.105  0.005  0.00  3717 
0  2  0  ‐0.225  0.017  0.00  583 
0  3  0  ‐0.509  0.101  0.00  50 
1  0  0  0.127  0.004  0.00  4562 
1  2  0  ‐0.034  0.003  0.00  6231 
1  2  1  ‐0.232  0.005  0.00  6231 
1  3  0  ‐0.058  0.012  0.00  423 
1  3  1  ‐0.328  0.022  0.00  423 
2  0  0  0.218  0.014  0.00  806 
2  1  0  0.058  0.002  0.00  6642 
2  1  1  0.239  0.005  0.00  6642 
2  3  0  0.001  0.002  0.50  4758 
2  3  1  ‐0.045  0.004  0.00  4758 
2  3  2  ‐0.180  0.007  0.00  4758 
3  0  0  0.293  0.060  0.00  69 
3  1  0  0.084  0.011  0.00  615 
3  1  1  0.303  0.019  0.00  615 
3  2  0  0.026  0.002  0.00  5401 
3  2  1  0.054  0.003  0.00  5401 
3  2  2  0.142  0.006  0.00  5401 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Change in average wages for firms that change layers - DADS (Robustness checks)
Table A31






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.116  0.004  0.00  5847 
0  2  0  ‐0.248  0.014  0.00  875 
0  3  0  ‐0.493  0.079  0.00  72 
1  0  0  0.135  0.004  0.00  6775 
1  2  0  ‐0.040  0.002  0.00  9338 
1  2  1  ‐0.244  0.004  0.00  9338 
1  3  0  ‐0.080  0.011  0.00  650 
1  3  1  ‐0.342  0.018  0.00  650 
2  0  0  0.237  0.012  0.00  1146 
2  1  0  0.064  0.002  0.00  9998 
2  1  1  0.248  0.004  0.00  9998 
2  3  0  ‐0.005  0.002  0.00  7369 
2  3  1  ‐0.055  0.003  0.00  7369 
2  3  2  ‐0.191  0.005  0.00  7369 
3  0  0  0.341  0.050  0.00  104 
3  1  0  0.088  0.009  0.00  903 
3  1  1  0.317  0.016  0.00  903 
3  2  0  0.028  0.002  0.00  8416 
3  2  1  0.058  0.003  0.00  8416 
3  2  2  0.147  0.004  0.00  8416 
 
Table A32 Table A33










Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.073  0.003  0.00  10432 
0  2  0  ‐0.172  0.011  0.00  1350 
0  3  0  ‐0.320  0.061  0.00  111 
1  0  0  0.100  0.003  0.00  11356 
1  2  0  ‐0.013  0.002  0.00  13695 
1  2  1  ‐0.176  0.003  0.00  13695 
1  3  0  ‐0.047  0.008  0.00  1065 
1  3  1  ‐0.279  0.014  0.00  1065 
2  0  0  0.181  0.009  0.00  1698 
2  1  0  0.039  0.002  0.00  14006 
2  1  1  0.172  0.003  0.00  14006 
2  3  0  0.009  0.001  0.00  11947 
2  3  1  ‐0.025  0.002  0.00  11947 
2  3  2  ‐0.129  0.004  0.00  11947 
3  0  0  0.274  0.044  0.00  142 
3  1  0  0.061  0.007  0.00  1342 
3  1  1  0.265  0.012  0.00  1342 
3  2  0  0.015  0.001  0.00  12864 
3  2  1  0.031  0.002  0.00  12864 
3  2  2  0.095  0.003  0.00  12864 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.076  0.004  0.00  5475 
0  2  0  ‐0.178  0.015  0.00  760 
0  3  0  ‐0.370  0.081  0.00  71 
1  0  0  0.101  0.003  0.00  6491 
1  2  0  ‐0.013  0.002  0.00  7589 
1  2  1  ‐0.179  0.004  0.00  7589 
1  3  0  ‐0.039  0.010  0.00  595 
1  3  1  ‐0.275  0.019  0.00  595 
2  0  0  0.183  0.012  0.00  1054 
2  1  0  0.037  0.002  0.00  7758 
2  1  1  0.172  0.004  0.00  7758 
2  3  0  0.009  0.002  0.00  6459 
2  3  1  ‐0.022  0.003  0.00  6459 
2  3  2  ‐0.129  0.005  0.00  6459 
3  0  0  0.227  0.052  0.00  85 
3  1  0  0.060  0.010  0.00  770 
3  1  1  0.256  0.017  0.00  770 
3  2  0  0.015  0.002  0.00  6948 
3  2  1  0.033  0.003  0.00  6948 
3  2  2  0.096  0.004  0.00  6948 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Firms that change export status and transition
Table A34
d lnn`Lit conditioning on adjacent layers
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  1.701  0.083  0.00  332 
0  2  0  2.159  0.207  0.00  49 
0  3  0  2.209  0.421  0.00  6 
1  0  0  ‐1.819  0.091  0.00  291 
1  2  0  1.182  0.065  0.00  577 
1  2  1  1.084  0.060  0.00  577 
1  3  0  1.332  0.192  0.00  53 
1  3  1  1.152  0.178  0.00  53 
2  0  0  ‐2.155  0.293  0.00  46 
2  1  0  ‐1.191  0.066  0.00  517 
2  1  1  ‐1.053  0.066  0.00  517 
2  3  0  1.508  0.062  0.00  590 
2  3  1  1.534  0.066  0.00  590 
2  3  2  1.297  0.065  0.00  590 
3  0  0  ‐2.569  0.353  0.00  11 
3  1  0  ‐1.692  0.254  0.00  45 
3  1  1  ‐1.447  0.260  0.00  45 
3  2  0  ‐1.695  0.063  0.00  637 
3  2  1  ‐1.679  0.067  0.00  637 
3  2  2  ‐1.488  0.064  0.00  637 
 
Table A35 Table A36
d lnw`Lit conditioning on adjacent layers d lnw
`
Lit conditioning on DADS wages
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.062  0.020  0.00  332 
0  2  0  ‐0.283  0.115  0.02  49 
0  3  0  ‐0.641  0.611  0.34  6 
1  0  0  0.096  0.023  0.00  291 
1  2  0  0.003  0.012  0.83  577 
1  2  1  ‐0.062  0.015  0.00  577 
1  3  0  ‐0.062  0.049  0.21  53 
1  3  1  ‐0.148  0.053  0.01  53 
2  0  0  0.216  0.072  0.00  46 
2  1  0  0.040  0.012  0.00  517 
2  1  1  0.071  0.016  0.00  517 
2  3  0  0.012  0.013  0.37  590 
2  3  1  0.008  0.014  0.00  590 
2  3  2  ‐0.074  0.016  0.00  590 
3  0  0  0.019  0.127  0.89  11 
3  1  0  0.085  0.056  0.14  45 
3  1  1  0.119  0.070  0.10  45 
3  2  0  0.020  0.011  0.08  637 
3  2  1  0.011  0.012  0.40  637 
3  2  2  0.079  0.014  0.00  637 
 
# of layers 
Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.064  0.012  0.00  528 
0  2  0  ‐0.256  0.051  0.00  95 
0  3  0  ‐0.766  0.263  0.01  15 
1  0  0  0.127  0.014  0.00  520 
1  2  0  ‐0.012  0.006  0.03  1132 
1  2  1  ‐0.219  0.013  0.00  1132 
1  3  0  ‐0.096  0.030  0.00  91 
1  3  1  ‐0.272  0.048  0.00  91 
2  0  0  0.271  0.054  0.00  100 
2  1  0  0.052  0.006  0.00  1119 
2  1  1  0.226  0.013  0.00  1119 
2  3  0  0.009  0.005  0.06  861 
2  3  1  ‐0.038  0.010  0.00  861 
2  3  2  ‐0.160  0.015  0.00  861 
3  0  0  0.305  0.154  0.07  16 
3  1  0  0.047  0.014  0.00  105 
3  1  1  0.386  0.052  0.00  105 
3  2  0  0.019  0.005  0.00  872 
3  2  1  0.047  0.009  0.00  872 
3  2  2  0.165  0.015  0.00  872 
 
Refer to Appendix B for a detailed description of how these tables were constructed.
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Table A37: Elasticity of w`L with V A for firms that do not change L
Robustness checks
Conditioning on selected sample
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.067 0.009 0.00 39,914
1 0 0.106 0.009 0.00 42,071
1 1 0.118 0.009 0.00 42,071
2 0 0.145 0.007 0.00 71,424
2 1 0.155 0.007 0.00 71,424
2 2 0.170 0.007 0.00 71,424
3 0 0.173 0.010 0.00 53,053
3 1 0.187 0.010 0.00 53,053
3 2 0.189 0.011 0.00 53,053
3 3 0.218 0.011 0.00 53,053
With DADS wages
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.000 0.003 0.94 45,606
1 0 0.001 0.002 0.63 65,114
1 1 0.019 0.003 0.00 65,114
2 0 -0.005 0.002 0.01 91,833
2 1 0.006 0.002 0.01 91,833
2 2 0.022 0.003 0.00 91,833
3 0 -0.007 0.002 0.05 53,053
3 1 0.008 0.002 0.00 53,053
3 2 0.009 0.003 0.01 53,053
3 3 0.038 0.006 0.00 53,053
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Table A38: Elasticity of w`L with V A for firms that change export status and do not change L
Robustness checks
Conditioning on selected sample
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.105 0.024 0.00 2,720
1 0 0.134 0.023 0.00 4,550
1 1 0.120 0.024 0.00 4,550
2 0 0.165 0.019 0.00 8,031
2 1 0.177 0.019 0.00 8,031
2 2 0.182 0.021 0.00 8,031
3 0 0.199 0.033 0.00 4,896
3 1 0.219 0.034 0.00 4,896
3 2 0.218 0.034 0.00 4,896
3 3 0.219 0.035 0.00 4,896
With DADS wages
# of layers Layer γ`L s.e. p-value obs
0 0 0.030 0.009 0.00 3,263
1 0 0.006 0.005 0.25 6,968
1 1 0.016 0.009 0.08 6,968
2 0 -0.006 0.005 0.19 10,507
2 1 0.010 0.006 0.09 10,507
2 2 0.017 0.008 0.03 10,507
3 0 -0.010 0.005 0.07 4,896
3 1 0.011 0.008 0.17 4,896
3 2 0.010 0.009 0.30 4,896
3 3 0.010 0.016 0.53 4,896
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Table A39: Firms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours, weighted by VA
# of layers N `L≥ N
`+1
L all ` N
0
L ≥N1L N1L ≥N2L N2L ≥N3L
1 88.8% 88.8% - -
2 63.2% 79.2% 76.3% -
3 57.1% 77.7% 73.4% 98.1%
N `L = hours at layer ` of a firm with L layers.
Table A40: Firms that satisfy a hierarchy in wages, weighted by VA
# of layers w`+1L ≥w`L all ` w1L ≥w0L w2L ≥w1L w3L ≥w2L
1 94.1% 94.1% - -
2 96.2% 98.1% 98.1% -
3 87.6% 99.2% 99.1% 89.2%
Robustness checks, conditioning on selected sample
Table A41: Firms that change export status and do not change L
# of layers Layer β`L s.e. p-value obs
1 0 -0.045 0.044 0.31 4,550
2 0 0.009 0.026 0.73 8,031
2 1 -0.013 0.028 0.64 8,031
3 0 0.200 0.053 0.00 4,896
3 1 0.073 0.038 0.06 4,896
3 2 0.084 0.042 0.05 4,896
Table A42: Elasticity of n`L with V A for firms that do not change L
# of layers Layer β`L s.e. p-value obs
1 0 0.027 0.014 0.06 42,071
2 0 0.036 0.009 0.00 71,424
2 1 0.013 0.011 0.26 71,424
3 0 0.109 0.014 0.00 53,053
3 1 0.048 0.013 0.00 53,053
3 2 0.037 0.013 0.01 53,053
61




Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  0.001  0.00  0.79  8779 
0  2  0  ‐0.072  0.02  0.00  953 
0  3  0  ‐0.338  0.13  0.01  68 
1  0  0  0.114  0.00  0.00  9645 
1  2  0  0.022  0.00  0.00  15118 
1  2  1  0.022  0.00  0.00  9358 
1  3  0  ‐0.034  0.01  0.02  981 
1  3  1  ‐0.034  0.02  0.10  536 
2  0  0  0.243  0.02  0.00  1264 
2  1  0  0.059  0.00  0.00  16048 
2  1  1  0.086  0.00  0.00  10055 
2  3  0  0.020  0.00  0.00  13455 
2  3  1  0.028  0.00  0.00  11975 
2  3  2  0.037  0.00  0.00  8912 
3  0  0  0.557  0.13  0.00  80 
3  1  0  0.111  0.01  0.00  1276 
3  1  1  0.165  0.02  0.00  723 
3  2  0  0.039  0.00  0.00  14508 
3  2  1  0.046  0.00  0.00  12948 






Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.268  0.01  0.00  7564 
0  2  0  ‐0.571  0.03  0.00  1133 
0  3  0  ‐0.954  0.13  0.00  94 
1  0  0  0.233  0.01  0.00  7848 
1  2  0  ‐0.130  0.00  0.00  13375 
1  2  1  ‐0.391  0.01  0.00  11406 
1  3  0  ‐0.246  0.02  0.00  982 
1  3  1  ‐0.515  0.02  0.00  929 
2  0  0  0.527  0.02  0.00  1321 
2  1  0  0.072  0.00  0.00  13707 
2  1  1  0.378  0.01  0.00  11530 
2  3  0  ‐0.087  0.00  0.00  12604 
2  3  1  ‐0.154  0.00  0.00  10045 
2  3  2  ‐0.339  0.01  0.00  10329 
3  0  0  1.059  0.12  0.00  123 
3  1  0  0.199  0.02  0.00  1226 
3  1  1  0.497  0.02  0.00  1137 
3  2  0  ‐0.033  0.00  0.00  13584 
3  2  1  0.021  0.00  0.00  10771 
3  2  2  0.188  0.01  0.00  10450 
 




Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  ‐0.139  0.00  0.00  6216 
0  2  0  ‐0.104  0.01  0.00  763 
0  3  0  ‐0.099  0.04  0.02  61 
1  0  0  0.029  0.00  0.00  8294 
1  2  0  ‐0.097  0.00  0.00  12269 
1  2  1  ‐0.156  0.01  0.00  4681 
1  3  0  ‐0.086  0.01  0.00  843 
1  3  1  ‐0.123  0.02  0.00  352 
2  0  0  0.069  0.01  0.00  1131 
2  1  0  ‐0.015  0.00  0.00  13854 
2  1  1  0.037  0.00  0.00  6821 
2  3  0  ‐0.073  0.00  0.00  12360 
2  3  1  ‐0.106  0.00  0.00  8930 
2  3  2  ‐0.168  0.01  0.00  5710 
3  0  0  0.037  0.03  0.21  69 
3  1  0  0.030  0.01  0.00  1157 
3  1  1  0.026  0.02  0.14  552 
3  2  0  ‐0.056  0.00  0.00  13451 
3  2  1  ‐0.060  0.00  0.00  10241 





Layer  Change  s.e.  p‐value  obs 
Before  After 
0  1  0  0.091  0.00  0.00  8148 
0  2  0  0.140  0.01  0.00  912 
0  3  0  0.185  0.03  0.00  58 
1  0  0  ‐0.052  0.00  0.00  6738 
1  2  0  0.049  0.00  0.00  13614 
1  2  1  0.114  0.00  0.00  6929 
1  3  0  0.091  0.01  0.00  919 
1  3  1  0.176  0.02  0.00  448 
2  0  0  ‐0.038  0.01  0.00  981 
2  1  0  ‐0.013  0.00  0.00  13097 
2  1  1  ‐0.070  0.01  0.00  4900 
2  3  0  0.033  0.00  0.00  12646 
2  3  1  0.055  0.00  0.00  9729 
2  3  2  0.174  0.01  0.00  7313 
3  0  0  ‐0.065  0.03  0.03  71 
3  1  0  ‐0.020  0.01  0.03  1090 
3  1  1  ‐0.046  0.02  0.02  468 
3  2  0  0.018  0.00  0.00  13547 
3  2  1  0.011  0.00  0.00  9805 
3  2  2  ‐0.011  0.01  0.07  6464 
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9 Appendix B - Data Description
Our dataset is built from two data sources, a firm-level source and a worker-level source, both
collected from the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE). We cover the manufacturing
sector of metropolitan France for the years 2002-2007. The firm-level source contains balance-sheet
information for all the firms reporting their income under the Bénéfice Réel Normal (BRN) fiscal
regime. This regime is compulsory for firms above a certain revenue threshold, but it can still
be adopted by smaller firms. The ratio between the value added of manufacturing firms in our
original, uncleaned BRN dataset and value added in manufacturing as reported by the French
National Statistical Institute is 96.4% on average. Each row in this dataset contains, among other
things, a firm identifier, total employment, total wages and employer-paid payroll taxes, total
value added, domestic, export and total sales, and an industry classification. The worker-level data
source is the Déclarations Annuel des Données Sociales (DADS). This dataset is built on mandatory
employer filing of the earnings of each salaried employee in France subject to the French payroll
taxes in a given year. Each row of this dataset is an employment spell and contains, among other
things, a worker identifier, his or her occupation, a firm identifier (which will be matched to the
BRN dataset), the number of hours worked, and the total gross wage received by the worker from
the firm.
9.1 Data processing
We start with the firm-level dataset, keeping only firms in the manufacturing sector. There are in
total 553,125 firm-year observations. We drop some existing duplicated firm-year identifiers and
then all firms with non-positive value added, total employment, total labor cost (i.e. total wages
plus payroll taxes) or total sales. This leaves us with 11.5% fewer observations. We then move to
the worker-level dataset. Starting from the universe of all observations, we keep the observations
referring to all employees in any firm in the French private sector. We drop observations with missing
or non-positive hours or total wage or with missing occupations. At this point, we match this dataset
with the firm-level dataset based on the firm identifier and year and keep the observations that are
matched (workers for which we find the firm and vice versa). This gives us a dataset of about 25.6
million observations for 6 years.16
To recover the occupational structure at the firm level, we work with the occupational code
reported in the worker-level data. The occupational classification used in the DADS is the PCS-
ESE 2003, and its first digit identifies 5 occupational categories relevant for manufacturing firms:
firm owners and CEO (code 2), senior staff or top management positions (code 3), supervisors
(code 4), white collar workers (code 5), blue collar workers (code 6).17 We relabel code 6 into code
16Note that the number of observations in any given year does not correspond to total employment. A worker can
have more than one row, for example, because of a job change during the year.
17 In this process, we find 599 observations of workers categorized as farmers (code 1). Since the firms in our sample
are only in the manufacturing sectors, we exclude from the analysis the 127 firm-year observations associated to these
workers.
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5, in order to create a unique category of blue and white collar workers, since their hourly wage
distribution coincides in the data (see Table 1). We are left with 4 occupational categories: for each
firm-year, we sum total hours and total wages of all the observations with the same occupation to
recover the occupational structure at the firm level. During the matching we lose about 5.9% of
the original dataset. Finally, we trim away firm-year observations with average hourly wages (see
below for details) above the 99.95th percentile, which would otherwise cause abnormal swings in
the average wage by year. Our final dataset is composed of 456,638 firm-year observations. These
observations represent on average 90.7% of the value added in the manufacturing sector in France.
To compute the average hourly wage at each occupation, we follow two alternative approaches.
The first simply divides the total wage resulting from the DADS by the total number of hours in
the same source. This approach doesn’t include payroll taxes and some other worker-related expen-
ditures paid by the firm. To approximate more closely the effective labor cost of each occupation
type for the firm, we compute the share of wages paid to a given occupation in the total wages paid
by the firm in the DADS source; we then apply this share to the total labor cost as in the BRN
dataset to compute the labor cost of the occupation considered. We finally divide this total cost
by the number of hours reported in the DADS to obtain the hourly wage from the BRN source.
This latter estimate is our preferred measure of hourly wages; we will use the former measure for
purposes of comparison and robustness checks.
We finally recode the name of the occupations into layers of management. A firm reporting
c occupational categories will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our
data we will have firms that have from 0 to 3 layers of management. We drop the name of the
occupation and assume that firms always grow from the lowest (occupations 5+6) to the highest skill
(occupation 2), irrespective of the name of the occupation itself. Hence a firm with occupational
categories 3 and 5 will have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0
corresponding to blue and white collar workers, and a layer 1 corresponding to senior staff. This
choice raises the question, what is the fraction of firms with the ‘correct’ordering of layers? Define
a firm with adjacent layers as a firm that only 1) reports occupations in adjacent categories, 2)
starting from occupation 5+6. In this definition, firms with occupations 2 and 4 or 2 and 3 are
not firms with adjacent layers; a firm with occupational categories 4 and 5 is. Table 4 shows that
on average, 81.6% of the firm-years in the sample (representing 96.7% of value added and 95.7%
of hours worked) meet this requirement. After this recoding, we can compute normalized hours.
We define normalized hours, n`L, in layer ` = 0, ..., 3 in a firm with L layers of management as the
number of hours in layer l per unit of hour worked in the top layer.
In results involving export behavior, we also exclude from the analysis firms that in some year
have negative domestic or export sales; the sample in this case is of 456,559 firm-year observations.
All monetary values are deflated to 2005 euros using a CPI deflator for France. Value added is
always expressed in thousands of euros; all hourly wages are in euros.
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9.2 Description of tables and figures
9.2.1 Definitions
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the tables and figures. We define
them here and consider them understood in what follows.
Average hourly wage from BRN: the total labor cost resulting from the balance sheet
divided by the number of hours in the DADS source.
Average hourly wage in layer ` from BRN: the total labor cost for layer ` in the BRN
divided by the number of hours reported in the DADS; the total labor cost for layer ` from the
BRN is the share of wages paid to layer ` in the total wages paid by the firm as in the DADS
source, multiplied by the total labor cost in the BRN.
Average hourly wage from DADS: the total wage payments in the DADS to all occupations
divided by the number of hours, always from the DADS source.
Firms with adjacent layers or firms in the ‘selected sample’: it is a firm that 1) reports
occupations in adjacent 1 digit PCS-ESE occupational categories, 2) starting from occupation 5+6
(blue and white collar workers). For examle, firms with occupations 2 and 4 or 2 and 3 do not have
adjacent layers; a firm with occupational categories 4 and 5 does and has 1 layer of management.
Layer number: is the position of the workers in the hierarchy of the firm, starting from
0 (lowest layer, present in all firms) to 3 (highest layer, only present in firms with 3 layers of
management).
Normalized hours: normalized hours in layer ` = 0, ..., L in a firm with L layers of manage-
ment are the number of hours in layer ` per unit of hour worked in the top layer L.
Number of layers of management: the total number of 1 digit occupations in the firm from
the DADS source minus 1.
Representative hierarchy of an L layers of management firm: for each layer ` = 0, ..., L,
we compute the average number of hours and the average hourly wage in the layer from the BRN
among firms with L layers of management. To mitigate the impact of outliers, the set of firms used
to compute each average is all the firms with the given number of layers, trimming observations
below the 0.05th and above the 99.95th percentile of the outcome variable. In a figure portraying a
firm with L layers of management, L+ 1 rectangles are shown, one for each layer. The horizontal
length of each rectangle is proportional to the number of hours in the layer (hours are reported
along the x−axis) while its height is proportional to the average hourly wage (the value of the wage
is reported to the left of each rectangle).
9.2.2 Descriptions
Table 1: This table reports, for each 1-digit occupational code present in the PCS-ESE 2003,
mean and percentiles of the hourly wage distribution across all firms and years in the data. One
observation in an occupation is the average hourly wage in a given firm-year from the BRN source,
conditional on the firm reporting the occupation. The average hourly wage is the total labor
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cost from the BRN dataset for an occupation, divided by the number of hours reported in this
occupation. The total labor cost for an occupation is computed multiplying the total labor cost
from the firm balance sheet times the share of wages paid to the occupation as resulting from the
DADS source. Occupation 6 excludes one outlier, which would have driven its mean to 28.94.
Table 2: This table reports, for each year, the number of firms in the dataset and corresponding
averages across all firms for selected variables. VA is the value added in the firm’s balance sheet.
Hours is the average number of hours from the DADS source. Wage is the average hourly wage
from the BRN. # of layers is the average number of layers of management across firms in each
year.
Table 3 and Table A1: Table 3 reports summary statistics on firm-level outcomes, grouping
firm-year observations according to the number of layers of management reported (# of layers).
Firm-years is the number of firm-years observations in the data with the given number of layers of
management. VA is the average value added from the firm’s balance sheet. Hours is the average
number of total hours from the DADS source. Wage is the average hourly wage from the BRN; to
mitigate the impact of outliers, the set of firms used to compute the average is all the firms with the
given number of layers, trimming observations below the 0.05th and above the 99.95th percentile of
the hourly wage distribution; the untrimmed averages across all firms in the cell are 30.48, 21.54,
21.21, and 22.41 for layers 0 to 3, respectively. Median Wage is the median across all firms in the
cell of the average hourly wage from the BRN source. Table A1 was constructed in the same way
using wages from DADS.
Table 4: This table reports the fraction of firms with adjacent layers conditioning on the
number of layers of management in the firm (first four columns) and overall (fifth column). The
first row reports the simple fraction of firms; the second and third rows assign a weight that is
proportional to the total value added in the balance sheet, and to the total hours in the DADS,
respectively.
Table 5, Table 6, Table A39 and Table A40: Table 5 reports the fraction of firms that
satisfy a hierarchy in hours, grouping firms by their number of layers of management (# number
of layers). Hours N `L is the number of hours reported in layer ` in an L layers of management
firm from the DADS source. For L = 1, 2, 3, and ` = 0, ..., L − 1, we say that a firm satisfies a
hierarchy in hours between layers number ` and ` + 1 in a given year if N `L ≥ N
`+1
L , i.e. if the
number of hours worked in layer ` is at least as large as the number of hours worked in layer `+ 1;
moreover, we say that a firm satisfies a hierarchy at all layers if N `L ≥ N
`+1
L ∀l = 0, ..., L − 1, i.e.
if the number of hours worked in layer ` is at least as large as the number of hours in layer `+ 1,
for all layers in the firm. Following these definitions, the top panel reports, among all firms with
L = 1, 2, 3 layers of management, the fraction of those that satisfy a hierarchy in hours at all layers
(first column), and the fraction of those that satisfy a hierarchy in hours between layer ` and `+ 1,
with ` = 0, ..., L − 1 (second to fourth column). Table A39 reports the same information when
weighting each firm according to the share of its value added among all firms with L layers. Table
6 is the same as Table 5 for the case of wages, where w`L is the average hourly wage in layer `
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from the BRN in an L layers of management firm. Table A40 reports the same information when
weighting each firm according to the share of its value added among all firms with L layers.
Table 7: Table 7 reports statistics on the mean share of variation in log hourly wages within
a firm associated to variation in average wages between layers. For each firm-year, we compute
the R2 of a regression of log hourly wages of workers within a firm on a constant and dummies for
layers (all except one), weighted by the number of hours each worker provides to the firm. For each
row, the column unweighted reports the average R2 across all firm-years, while the remaining two
columns to the right report the same average when weighting firms by their total number of hours
or total value added. The column firm-years reports the number of firm-years used to compute
the statistics in the corresponding row (note that for some firms - for example firms with only one
worker - the R2 cannot be computed, and hence the total number of firm-year in the dataset does
not correspond to the total number of firm-years used). Each row differs from the others according
to the subsample of firm-years used in computing the average R2.
Table 8 and Table A3: Table 8 reports the distribution of the number of layers of management
at time t+1, grouping firms according to the number of layers of management at time t. Among
all firms with L layers of management (L = 0, ..., 3) in any year from 2002 to 2006, the columns
report the fraction of firms that have layers 0, ..., 3 the following year (from 2003 to 2007), or are
not present in the dataset, Exit. The elements in the table sum to 100% by row. Table A3 reports
the same information when weighting each firm according to the share of its value added.
Table 9 and Table 10: Table 9 shows the slope and robust standard errors of a set of
regressions of log number of normalized hours worked at a given layer on log value added of the firm
across firm-year observations. Specifically, each row lnn`L/n
L
L reports the results of two regressions.
The columns with heading Without FE (With FE ) report the slope and the robust standard error
of a regression of log normalized hours in layer ` on log value added among firms with L layers of
management, in the raw data (controlling for year and 2 digit industry fixed effects). To mitigate
the impact of outliers, the set of firms used to compute each regression is all the firms with the
given number of layers, trimming observations below the 0.05th and above the 99.95th percentile of
each variable. Table 10 was constructed in the same way for the case of hourly wages.
Table 11 and Table A42: These two tables report the results of regressions of log change in
normalized hours by layer on log change in value added for firms that do not change their number
of layers of management L across two adjacent periods. Specifically, we run a regression of log
change in normalized hours at layer ` (layer) in a firm with L (# of layers in the firm) layers of
management on a constant and log change in value added across all the firms that stay at L layers
of management across two adjacent years. β`L is the coeffi cient on log change in value added, s.e.
and p-value are its robust standard error and p-value, and obs is the number of observations in the
regression. The first table (Table 11) uses all the firms that are observed to stay at the same layer,
while the second one (Table A42) replicates it considering only firms with adjacent layers before
and after the transition.
Table 12 and Table A37: These tables report the results of regressions of log change in
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hourly wage by layer on log change in value added for firms that do not change their number
of layers of management L across two adjacent periods. Specifically, we run a regression of log
change in average hourly wage at layer ` (layer) in a firm with L (# of layers in the firm) layers
of management on a constant and log change in value added across all the firms that stay at L
layers of management across two adjacent years. β is the coeffi cient on log change in value added,
s.e. and p-value are its robust standard error and p-value, and obs is the number of observations
used in the regression. Table 12 uses hourly wage at layer ` from the BRN. The first panel in Table
A37 uses the selected sample, all the firms that are observed to stay at the same layer. The second
panel uses hourly wage at layer ` from DADS.
Table 13: This table shows changes in firm-level outcomes between adjacent years for all firms
(All), and for the subsets of those that increase (Increase L), don’t change (No change in L) and
decrease (Decrease L) layers. It reports changes in log hours, log normalized hours, log average
wage from the BRN, and log average wage in common layers for the whole sample. The change
in average wage for common layers in a firm that transitions from L to L′ layers is the change in
the average wage from the BRN computed using only the first min {L,L′} layers before and after
the transition. To detrend a variable, we subtract from all the log changes in a given year the
average change during the year across all firms. In the last two rows of the table, % of firms is
the percentage of firms observed doing each type of transition; % VA change is the fraction of the
total change in real value added observed in the dataset accounted for by firms making the given
transition.
Table 14 and Tables A6-A16: This set of tables show estimates of the average log change in
normalized hours at each layer ` (Layer) among firms that transition from L (# of layers before)
to L′ layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L′: for a transition from L to L′, we can only evaluate
changes for layer number ` = 0, ...,min{L,L′}. Change is the average log change in the transition,
estimated as a regression of the log change in the number of normalized hours in layer ` in two
adjacent years on a constant. s.e. is the robust standard error associated with the constant, p-
value its p-value, and obs the number of observations used in the regression. Different tables differ
according to the sample of observations used to compute the change. The first table (Table 14) uses
all observed transitions in the sample; all the other tables condition on positive (negative) changes
in the indicated variables when firms add (drop) layers; in particular, observations are selected on
changes in value added (A6), in value added and total hours (A7), in total hours of the firm (A8),
in the total normalized hours of the firm (A9), and in value added and total normalized hours
(A10). The table series Selected sample (Tables A11-A16) replicates the same set of 6 regression
tables when we consider only firms with adjacent layers before and after the transition.
Table 15 and Tables A17-A33: This set of tables show estimates of the average log change
in hourly wage at each layer ` among firms that transition from L (# of layers before) to L′ layers
(# of layers after), with L 6= L′: for a transition from L to L′, we can only evaluate changes for
layer number ` = 0, ...,min{L,L′}. Change is the average log change in the transition, estimated
as a regression of the log change in the average hourly wage at layer ` in two adjacent years on
68
a constant. s.e. is the robust standard error associated with the constant, p-value its p-value,
and obs the number of observations used in the regression. We start by describing tables that use
hourly wage at each layer ` from the BRN (a correspondent set of tables replicate the results using
average hourly wage at each layer from DADS). Different tables differ according to the sample of
observations used to compute the change. The first table (Table 15) uses all observed transitions in
the sample; all the other tables condition on positive (negative) changes of the indicated variables
when firms add (drop) layers; in particular, observations are selected on changes in value added
(A17), in value added and total hours (A18), in total hours of the firm (A19), in the total normalized
hours of the firm (A20), and in value added and total normalized hours (A21). The Table series
Selected sample (Tables A22-A27) replicates the same set of 6 regression tables when we consider
only firms with adjacent layers before and after the transition. The table series DADS (Tables
A28-A33) shows the average log change in hourly wage at each layer ` from DADS, using all firms.
Table 16: This table shows the sources of change in the average hourly wage from the BRN,
by type of transition. For a given firm transitioning from L to L′ > L layers, write the log change
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for each firm and report in the cells the average of each of these
quantities in the first three panels; the fourth panel shows the overall average log change d ln w̄Lit
in hourly wage during the indicated transition. Each cell is computed excluding observations below
the 0.05th and above the 99.95th percentile.
Table 17: This table shows summary statistics of firm-year variables broken down by export
status of the firm. VA is the value added in the firm’s balance sheet. Hours is the number of hours
from the DADS source. Wage is the average hourly wage in the firm across all occupations. # of
layers is the number of layers of management in the firm.
Table 18: This table shows the fraction of firms in the data that have positive export sales,
grouping firms by their number of layers of management (# of layers). Unweighted reports the
fraction of exporters in the raw data. Weighted by VA reports the fraction of firms that are
exporters, where each firm receives a weight proportional to its value added in the year considered.
Table 19: This table shows the composition of firms by number of layers of management (#
of layers), broken down by export status.
Table 20 and Table A5: Table 20 shows, for each transition from L to L′, the difference
between the fraction of domestic sellers entering the export market that make the transition and
the fraction of domestic sellers not entering the export market that make the same transition. Each
number is computed as follows. Consider all the firms that have L layers in a given period, and
either do not export before and after, or do not export before but export after; among all these
firms, let d be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is transitioning from L to L′ in a given
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period, and zero otherwise; we run a regression of d on a constant and a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm is entering the export market. Robust standard errors are used to compute the significance
levels. Table A5 replicates the same analysis for the case of all firms that exit the export, the ones
that drop layers and the ones that do not change layers.
Table 21: This table focuses on firms entering the export market and shows changes in firm-
level outcomes between adjacent years for all firms (All), and for the subsets of those that increase
(Increase L), and don’t change (No change in L) layers. It reports changes in log hours, log
normalized hours, log average wage from the BRN, and log average wage in common layers for the
whole sample. It is parallel to Table 13 and shares the same content and methodology. The time
trend is computed with respect to all firms in the sample, not just new exporters.
Table 22 and Table A41: Table 22 reports the results of regressions of log change in nor-
malized hours by layer on log change in value added for firms that do not change their number of
layers of management L across two adjacent periods and either enter or exit the export market.
Specifically, we run a regression of log change in normalized hours at layer ` (layer) in a firm with L
(# of layers in the firm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added across
all the firms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. β is the coeffi cient on
log change in value added, s.e. and p-value are its robust standard error and p-value, and obs is
the number of observations used in the regression. This table shares with Table 11 the content and
the methodology. Table A41 reports the same as Table 22 only using the selected sample.
Table 23 and Table A38: Table 23 reports the results of regressions of log change in hourly
wage by layer on log change in value added for firms that do not change their number of layers of
management L across two adjacent periods and either enter or exit the export market. Specifically,
we run a regression of log change in average hourly wage at layer ` (layer) in a firm with L (# of
layers in the firm) layers of management on a constant and log change in value added across all
the firms that stay at L layers of management across two adjacent years. β is the coeffi cient on log
change in value added, s.e. and p-value are its robust standard error and p-value, and obs is the
number of observations used in the regression. This table shares with Table 12 the content and the
methodology. The first panel in Table A38 uses the selected sample, all the firms that are observed
to stay at the same layer. The second panel in Table A38 uses hourly wage at layer ` from DADS.
Table 24 and Table A34: Table 24 shows estimates of the average log change in normal-
ized hours at each layer ` among firms that enter (exit) the export market and concurrently add
(drop) layers of management. Specifically, the table reports estimates of the average log change in
normalized hours at each layer ` (Layer) among firms that transition from L (# of layers before)
to L′ layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L′: for a transition from L to L′, we can only evaluate
changes for layer number ` = 0, ...,min{L,L′}. Change is the average log change in the transition.
This table shares with table 14 the content and the methodology. Table A34 presents the results
conditioning on the selected sample.
Table 25, Table A35, and Table A36: Table 25 shows estimates of the average log change
in hourly wage at each layer ` from the BRN among firms that enter (exit) the export market
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and concurrently add (drop) layers of management. Specifically, the table reports estimates of the
average log change in hourly wage at each layer ` (Layer) among firms that transition from L (#
of layers before) to L′ layers (# of layers after), with L 6= L′: for a transition from L to L′, we
can only evaluate changes for layer number ` = 0, ...,min{L,L′}. Change is the average log change
in the transition. This table shares with table 15 the content and the methodology. Table A35
presents the results using the selected sample, all the firms that are observed to stay at the same
layer. Table A36 presents the results using hourly wage at layer ` from DADS.
Table 26: This table shows the sources of change in the average hourly wage from the BRN,
by type of transition, focusing on firms entering the export market. The contents and methodology
are the same as those reported in Table 16.
Table A4: This table reports the fraction of firms that have adjacent layers at time t+1,
conditional on having adjacent layers at time t. Transition Up reports, among all firms with L
adjacent layers of management in any year (from 2002 to 2006) that stay in the sample the year
after, the fraction of those moving to L + 1 adjacent layers of management, with L = 0, 1, 2.
Transition Down reports, among all firms with L adjacent layers of management in any year (from
2002 to 2006) that stay in the sample the year after, the fraction of those moving to L− 1 adjacent
layers of management, with L = 1, 2, 3.
Table A43-A46: These tables report the sources of changes in the average wage by layer
during a transition. Some introductory notation will aid clarity. For any given firm, denote with
i an employee, with h (i), w (i) and ` (i) the hours worked, the total wage received, and his or her
wage before a transition, and let us use primes to denote the same outcomes after a transition,
h′ (i), w′ (i) and `′ (i). If an employee is not present in the firm before a transition then ` (i) = −1,
and h (i) = w (i) = 0 (and analogously if an employee is not present after a transition). In the
employee level dataset for year t, a given employee’s row reports his or her outcomes for year t
(after a transition) and year t − 1 (before a transition), provided the employee stays in the same
firm. Given the way the data is reported, an employee may have ` (i) = −1 even if he or she was
in the same firm but switched to a different plant, or switched occupation in the middle of the year
(rather than at the end of the preceding year): in fact, more rows of data may be present for the
same employee. For these reasons, our processing implies an over-estimation of hours leaving the
layer and entering the layer, as opposed to hours staying in the layer during a transition. To track
the flow of hours across layers we reconstruct transitions observed from year t−1 to year t by using
only the employee level dataset for year t (rather than using separately the datasets at time t and
time t− 1, which would lose such flow). In a number of cases (less than 1/30,000) we are not able
to match perfectly the layer structure of the firm with the one recovered by only using information
of employees at time t in each year. For a given firm transitioning from L to L′ layers, fix a layer
¯̀which is common to both before and after the transition. Hours worked in ¯̀ after the transition
can be grouped in hours worked by employees coming 1) from the same layer or 2) from outside the
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′ (i)], respectively. Similarly, we can group hours worked in ¯̀before the transition
in hours worked by employees who will 1) stay in the same layer or 2) leave the layer, and compute
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∑
i:`(i)=¯̀6=`′(i) h (i)], respectively. Tables
A43- A46 report differences between these averages across all firms where both quantities can be
computed, for each transition and each layer common to before and after the transition. Table A43










, i.e., the average change in the hourly wage for hours worked











the average log difference between the hourly wage after the transition of hours which came from
outside the layer and the hourly wage before the transition of hours which are going to leave the










, i.e., the average log difference, after
the transition, in the hourly wage of hours coming from outside the layer vs. hours who stayed










, i.e., the average log difference,
before the transition, in the hourly wage of hours who will leave the layer vs. hours who will stay
in the layer.
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4: These figures report kernel density estimates of the
distribution of log value added (Figure 2), log hours worked (Figure 3) and log hourly wage (Figure
4) by number of layers in the firm. We describe Figure 2; Figures 3 and 4 are constructed in the same
way but instead of using value added, we use hours worked and hourly wage, respectively. The left
panel reports the kernel density estimate of the distribution of log value added on the raw data: one
density is estimated for each group of firms with the same number of layers. The right panel shows
the same density estimated after removing year and industry fixed effects. To remove these effects,







where vi is value added for firm-year i, and layersi·, industryi·, and yeari· are a set of layers, 2
digit industry and year dummies, respectively. The omitted dummy for layers is for firms with
zero layers of management. The log value added for firm-year i without year and industry fixed
effects is then log v̂i = logm +
∑
j β̂jlayersij + ε̂i, where we set m to the median value added in
2002 for firms with zero layers of management. We then compute 4 kernel density estimates of the
distribution of log v̂i, grouping firms according to their number of layers.
Figure 7 and Figure A1: These figures show the probability of transition away from the
current layer as a function of the initial value added of the firm. Figure A1 shows these probabilities
in the raw data. Each panel reports transition probabilities starting from a different initial number
of layers. To produce the panel of transitions out of layer L = 0, ..., 3, we take for each year (from
2002 to 2006) all the firms with L layers of management and group them into 100 bins according
to their value added; for each bin, we compute the fraction of firms that will have any number
of layers (or exit the dataset) in the following period and plot the average value added in the bin
against this fraction. In Figure 7, for each transition series we then apply a lowess smoothing for
all the probabilities estimated from the first to the 99th bin.
Figures 8: This figure portrays, for each transition type, the estimated log change (on the
72
y-axis) in the percentiles (on the x-axis) of the wage distribution within firms, after the transition
vs. before the transition, and associated 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. To compute
these panels, we first construct a employee-level dataset that contains log hourly wage of each
employee, a firm identifier, year and current number of layers of the firm, and we remove year
and firm fixed effects from the log hourly wage distribution. We then focus on all the hours
worked in firm-years observations where the firm is making a transition from ` to `′ layers (both
before and after the transition takes place) and compute the pth percentile (for p = 1, ..., 99) in
two distributions: the wage distribution after the transition and the wage distribution before the
transition. Each distribution of hourly wages is computed making sure that each employee receives
a weight proportional to his or her number of hours in the firm, but giving to each firm the same
weight, regardless of the total number of hours worked in it (to be consistent with our estimates of
changes in log wages in Table 15 in the paper). The y-axis in each panel reports the log difference
between the wage at the pth percentile after, less its correspondent wage before the transition
(hence, a negative number implies a shift to the left of the distribution at the given percentile). To
compute standard errors, we performed 500 bootstrap replications of this process, clustering the
sampling at firm-transition level (i.e., one cluster contains all the employees present either before
or after a transition in one firm) to preserve the within-firm and within-transition correlation in
wages present in the data, and we report the 5th and 95th percentiles of these replications.
Figures 9: This figure portrays, for each transition type, the estimated log change (on the y-
axis) in the percentiles (on the x-axis) of the wage distribution in common layers within firms, after
the transition vs. before the transition, and associated 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. To
build it we follow the same process described in Figure 8, to which we refer, with the only difference
that after removing year and firm fixed effects, we focus on the wage distribution implied by all
hours worked in layers which are common before and after the transition.
Figure 10 and Figure A12: Figure 10 portrays, for firms staying at a given number of layers
in two consecutive years and positive change in value added, the estimated log change (on the
y-axis) in the percentiles (on the x-axis) of the wage distribution within firms, the year after less
the year before, and associated 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. To build it we follow the
same process described in Figure 8. Figure A12 portrays the estimated log change (on the y-axis)
in the percentiles (on the x-axis) of the wage distribution within firms, for firms staying at a given
number of layers in two consecutive years and negative change in value added.
Figures 11-13: These figures depict hierarchies of firms before and after a transition, using
normalized hours: each panel focuses on transitions from L to L+1 layers of management and from
L + 1 to L, for L = 0, 1, 2. In each panel, for fixed L, the left column portrays the representative
hierarchy with L layers of management and normalized hours, using only firms that will make
the indicated transition. The right column estimates the hierarchy after the transition using the
average log changes in each quantity as resulting from our estimates reported in Tables 14 and
15: the wage (normalized hours) in layer ` after the transition from L to L + 1 is computed as
the average hourly wage (normalized hours) before the transition multiplied times exp(b), where
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b is the average log change in wages (normalized hours) at layer ` in transitions from L to L + 1.
Normalized hours after a transition are always set to 1 for the top layer. An analogous procedure
is followed for transitions from L+1 to L. For transitions one layer up, the hourly wage for the top
layer after the transition is computed as follows: we estimate the average log change in the wage of
the top layer (lnwL+1L+1 − lnwLL) and multiply the wage at the top layer before the transition times
the exponential of this change.
Figures 14-16: These figures portray hierarchies of firms before and after a transition, using
normalized hours, for firms entering the export market: each panel of four graphs focuses on
transitions from L to L + 1 layers of management (first row), and from L to L (second row), for
L = 0, 1, 2. To estimate the hierarchies before and after a transition (first row of graphs), we
consider only the subset of firms with L layers that will enter the export market and have L + 1
layers the following period. We use these firms to compute the representative hierarchy before the
transition (top left graph). To estimate the representative hierarchy after the transition (top right
graph), we follow the procedure indicated in Figure 11 and use the estimated log changes for firms
entering the export market from Tables 24 and 25. To estimate the hierarchies for firms that do
not switch while entering (second row of graphs) we consider only the subset of firms with L layers
that will enter the export market and stay at L layers the following period. We use this set of firms
to compute the representative hierarchy before the transition (bottom left graph). To compute the
change in each layer level outcome, we regress the change in log outcome on change in log value
added, with no constant; each layer level quantity after the transition is computed as the layer level
quantity before the transition times the exponential of the predicted log change associated with
the mean increase in value added observed for these firms.
Figures A3-A9: Figures A3-A5 show the relation between the number of normalized hours
worked at each layer against the value added in the firm, grouping firms by number of layers of
management across firm-year observations. Each of the 3 panels fixes the number of layers of
management L = 1, 2, 3 and shows L scatterplots, showing the relation between the number of
normalized hours worked in each layer ` = 1, .., L against the value added in the firm. To mitigate
the impact of outliers, the set of firms used to produce each graph is all the firms with the given
number of layers, trimming observations below the 0.05th and above the 99.95th percentile of each
variable. The regression line fits a linear relation between log normalized hours and log value added
and is computed using the same trimming procedure. Figures A6-A9 replicated the same for the
case of average hourly wage from the BRN at each layer `.
Figure A10 and Figure A11: These figures show the change in the hierarchical structure
of a firm with 2 layers of management associated with (first panel) a 5% increase in value added
when the firm adds a third layer (first row) or stays at 2 layers (second row), and (second panel)
a 5% decrease in value added when the firm drops one layer (first row) or stays at 2 layers (second
row). Consider the first panel (the second panel will follow an analogous procedure). To estimate
the hierarchies before and after a transition (first row of graphs), we consider only the subset of
firms with 2 layers that will become 3 layers the following period, increasing value added and total
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hours. We group these firms in three terciles according to the size of their value added before the
transition, and we use the middle tercile of these firms to compute the representative hierarchy
before the transition (top left graph). To estimate the representative hierarchy after the transition,
we regress the log change in layer level outcomes (normalized hours and hourly wage for each layer
` = 0, ..., 2) on a set of three dummies (one for each tercile) and log change in value added, using
the same subset of firms; again, to mitigate the impact of outliers, each of the six regressions is
run on the subsample of firms trimmed of the observations below the 0.05th and above the 99.95th
percentile of each variable. Each layer level quantity after the transition is computed as the layer
level quantity before the transition times the exponential of the predicted log change for a firm in
the middle tercile following a 5% change in value added. The average hourly wage of the third layer
after the transition is computed using changes in the top layer (consistent with Figures 10 - 12),
following the same procedure described here. To estimate the change in the hierarchy for firms that
do not transition (second row of graphs) we proceed as follows. We compute the representative
hierarchy before the transition using firms in the middle tercile of value added among those that
do not transition. To compute the change in each layer level outcome we regress the change in log
outcome on change in log value added, with no constant, using the set of all firms staying at 2
layers (trimming as above); each layer level quantity after the transition is computed as the layer
level quantity before the transition times the exponential of the predicted log change associated
with a 5% increase in value added.
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